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This study investigates the macroeconomic consequences of firm-level accounting 
conservatism.  Consistent with conditional conservatism extending to the aggregate level, 
I demonstrate that annual estimates of aggregate corporate profits and gross domestic 
product from 1929 to 2007 compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis are more 
sensitive to negative aggregate cash flow news than to positive aggregate cash flow news.  
Next, I estimate the dollar value impact of firm-level accounting conservatism on 
measurements of macroeconomic fundamentals.  Finally, I show that the federal funds 
rate set by the U.S. Federal Reserve tends to be lower when the dollar value impact of 
firm-level accounting conservatism on gross domestic product measurements is larger.  
These results suggest that accounting can impact social welfare by altering the 
measurement attributes of key macroeconomic indicators and shaping monetary policy 
decisions which regulate the money supply and alter macroeconomic growth. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
This study investigates the macroeconomic consequences of firm-level accounting 
conservatism.  Accounting conservatism has been defined as the tendency to require a 
higher degree of verification for recognizing gains as compared to losses (Basu 1997, 
Watts 2003a).  Using firm-level stock returns as a proxy for news, Basu (1997) provides 
evidence that this asymmetric verification requirement results in conditionally 
conservative firm-level earnings that are more sensitive to bad news than to good news.  
A large subsequent literature asserts that firms choose to report conservatively in order to 
lower debt and compensation contracting costs, reduce litigation risk, and minimize tax 
payments.  Firm-level earnings could also be conservative in response to accounting 
standards, securities regulation, and pressure from external auditors (see Watts 2003a and 
2003b for a review).   
I examine whether firm-level conservatism aggregates to alter the measurement 
attributes of macroeconomic indicators and influence monetary policy decisions.  First, I 
investigate whether the summation of individual firm earnings results in a conditionally 
conservative aggregate corporate profits signal.  Specifically, I examine the time-series 
behavior of annual estimates of aggregate corporate profits from 1929 to 2007 as 
compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), an agency of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce.  I adapt the Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness regression to 
accommodate aggregate-level time-series data, and I form proxies for aggregate 
corporate sector news using the Campbell (1991) return decomposition framework.  
Consistent with the existence of conditional conservatism at the aggregate level, the 
results indicate that aggregate corporate profits are more sensitive to negative aggregate 
cash flow news than to positive aggregate cash flow news. 
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Identifying conditional conservatism within aggregate corporate profits is 
important for several reasons.  First, U.S. Census Bureau data indicates that publicly 
traded firms constitute only 1% of all firms and account for less than 33% of business 
employment (Davis et al. 2006).  Because the aggregate corporate profits measure 
compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis includes the earnings of both public and 
private firms, my study helps identify how firm-level accounting conservatism influences 
measurements of the economic performance of the entire U.S. corporate sector.   
Second, the BEA’s measure of aggregate corporate profits is a key 
macroeconomic indicator that receives extensive media attention and is used by a wide 
variety of market participants.  For example, aggregate corporate profits is used by 
macroeconomic forecasters to predict aggregate investment in plant and equipment, 
government policy makers to project tax receipts, firms to make long-term investment 
and employment planning decisions, investors to assess the overall financial health of the 
U.S. corporate sector, and academic researchers to identify complex macroeconomic 
relationships (BEA 2004).   
Third, and perhaps most importantly, aggregate corporate profits are a significant 
component of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP).  In 2007, aggregate corporate profits 
totaled $1.6 trillion, which amounted to 11.9% of U.S. GDP for the year.  GDP is a 
closely watched macroeconomic indicator that provides a summary measure of economic 
conditions in the United States (BEA 2008).  Moreover, GDP measurements influence 
decisions made by policy makers, firms, investors, and households (BEA 2002).  For 
example, GDP estimates are used by the federal government in forming the national 
budget and assessing the effects of fiscal policy decisions, and the U.S. Federal Reserve 
relies on GDP estimates when executing monetary policy.  Accordingly, I examine 
whether the influence of firm-level accounting conservatism extends beyond aggregate 
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corporate profits to alter the measurement attributes of GDP signals.  The results indicate 
that GDP measurements are more sensitive to negative aggregate cash flow news than to 
positive aggregate cash flow news.   
Finally, I investigate whether accounting conservatism’s impact on 
macroeconomic indicators affects macroeconomic decision making.  Specifically, I 
examine monetary policy decisions made by the U.S. Federal Reserve (the Fed).  One 
way the Fed executes monetary policy is by manipulating the federal funds rate in order 
to influence the money supply and alter macroeconomic growth.  The Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) of the Fed relies on GDP measurements when setting the 
federal funds rate (Taylor 1993).  Therefore, firm-level accounting conservatism may 
influence federal funds rate decisions by altering the GDP measurements upon which the 
FOMC relies.   
I investigate accounting conservatism’s influence on FOMC decisions by first 
quantifying the dollar value impact of firm-level accounting conservatism on 
measurements of macroeconomic fundamentals.  From 1963 to 2007, I estimate that 
aggregate corporate profits and gross domestic product would have averaged 
approximately $114 billion greater per year in the absence of accounting conservatism.  
Finally, I estimate a series of monetary policy reaction functions.  The results indicate 
that the federal funds rate tends to be lower when the dollar value impact of firm-level 
conservatism on GDP measurements is larger.   
The results of this study should be of interest to both accounting and economics 
researchers as well as to a variety of capital market participants.  Prior research suggests 
that accounting serves several non-mutually exclusive roles including providing new 
information to equity investors (see Kothari 2001 for a review), facilitating efficient 
contracting (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, Ball 2001), disciplining managers’ disclosure 
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behavior (Gigler and Hemmer 1998, Stocken 2000, Lundholm 2003), and improving 
managerial decision making (Waymire 2009).  These prior results are important because 
they imply that accounting can help solve society’s fundamental economic problem of 
maximizing social welfare by allocating scarce resources to their most efficient uses. 
My study contributes to the literature by empirically identifying previously 
unexplored macroeconomic consequences of accounting.  My results suggest that firm-
level accounting conservatism influences the price of money (i.e. interest rates) by 
altering the measurement attributes of key macroeconomic indicators used by the Fed 
when executing monetary policy.  Thus, aggregated accounting measurements may alter 
firms’ cost of capital through the risk-free rate, even in a Capital Asset Pricing Model 
environment without firm-specific information risk.  As a result, accounting’s impact on 
social welfare may not be strictly limited to helping allocate resources towards (away) 
from firms and projects with the highest (lowest) net present value.  Instead, my results 
suggest that accounting can also affect the money supply (i.e. the total number of dollars 
in the macroeconomic pie).   In turn, changes in firms’ cost of capital should influence 
not only resource allocation decisions but also firms’ investment opportunity sets, the 
pace of macroeconomic growth, aggregate output and inflation, and total social welfare.   
Second, my results could have implications for policy setters and macroeconomic 
decision makers.  The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recently released 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 8 as part of convergence efforts 
with the International Accounting Standards Board.  SFAC No. 8 revises the FASB’s 
conceptual framework and states that the aim of financial reporting is to provide 
information that is useful to investors and creditors in making decisions about providing 
resources to a firm.  As part of the focus on individual reporting entities rather than on the 
economy as a whole, the FASB excludes regulators, fiscal policy setters, and other 
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macroeconomic decision makers from the list of primary financial statement users (FASB 
2010).  However, my results suggest that financial reporting choices made by self-
interested firms acting within the bounds of accounting standards can aggregate and 
influence output from the national economic accounts.  Consequently, standard setter 
actions designed to aid microeconomic decision makers (e.g. investors and creditors) may 
produce inadvertent macroeconomic consequences by imposing an information 
externality on decision makers who rely on aggregate measurements (e.g. a central 
banker setting interest rates).   
Furthermore, understanding how accounting measurements interact with the 
national economic accounts is important because measurement practices at the firm level 
can affect the way economists measure economic output and income at the aggregate 
level.  For example, the increased use of fair value measurements and the proposed 
convergence between Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) could indirectly change the 
measurement attributes of aggregate corporate profits and GDP and result in unintended 
macroeconomic consequences. 
Lastly, my study has implications for academic researchers.  The majority of 
capital markets research in accounting focuses on microeconomic behavior and generally 
presumes that capital allocation decisions have been delegated to a market.  However, the 
U.S. is a mixed economy with numerous elements of central planning including an active 
central bank, partial nationalization of major banks and heavy industry, and fiscal 
intervention in times of financial crises.  As an example, the Federal Reserve acts as a 
pseudo-monopolist by influencing short-term interest rates outside of a pure market 
setting.  My results suggest that conservative financial reporting at the firm level 
influences monetary policy decisions by altering the measurement attributes of statistical 
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aggregates that the Federal Reserve and other macroeconomic decision makers rely upon.  
These results are important because they suggest that accounting can affect both the 
productive and exchange sectors of the economy by influencing the money supply and 
that accounting’s impact on social welfare is not limited to market settings.  Additionally, 
understanding how central bankers, regulators, and other macroeconomic actors use 
accounting information when making centralized economic decisions is particularly 
important given a shift towards more government regulation and intervention in global 
capital markets.    
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Chapter 2:  Motivation and Prior Literature 
2.1 Motivation 
Whether or not firm-level conditional conservatism extends to the aggregate level 
is an open empirical question.  The summation of individual firm earnings could result in 
a conservative aggregate corporate profits signal if the determinants of conservative 
financial reporting are positively correlated across firms.  For instance, prior research 
suggests that the demand for conservatism varies according to the regulatory and 
litigation environments which are systematic across firms within a given country (Ball et 
al. 2000).  Seetharaman et al. (2005) demonstrate that conservatism declined for U.S. 
firms after passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.  The authors 
conclude that a decrease in litigation risk reduced firms’ need for conservative reporting.  
Similarly, Lobo and Zhou (2006) find that conservatism increased after passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, consistent with an increase in litigation risk for both 
managers and auditors.  Finally, Callen, Guan, and Qiu (2010) find that firm-level 
earnings became more conservative after the passage of state anti-takeover laws, 
consistent with conservatism acting as a substitute governance mechanism.  These results 
suggest that exogenous shocks to the regulatory and litigation environments can affect the 
degree of earnings conservatism for a large number of firms simultaneously.  Hence, a 
portion of the conservatism present in firms’ earnings may be systematic and not 
diversified away when aggregating the population of firm-level earnings.   
However, aggregate corporate profits may fail to exhibit an asymmetric response 
to bad news as compared to good news for several reasons.  First, aggregate corporate 
profits as compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis include the earnings of both 
publicly traded and privately held firms.  The inclusion of private firms is notable 
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because private firms constitute approximately 99% of all firms in the U.S. (Davis et al. 
2006).  Additionally, private firms generally have less incentive to report conservatively 
(Ball and Shivakumar 2005).  For example, compared to public firms, private firms 
should be better able to resolve information asymmetry between management and other 
parties through private communications with shareholders, creditors, employees, and 
suppliers.  As a result, there is less demand for accounting conservatism as a governance 
device within private firms.  Consistent with this lesser demand for conservatism, Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005) empirically document that the earnings of private firms in the 
U.K. exhibit significantly less timely loss recognition than public firms facing similar 
regulation, audit practices, and taxes.  Therefore, aggregate corporate profits as compiled 
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis may fail to exhibit conditional conservatism given 
the relative mix and reporting incentives of the public and private firms in the population.   
Second, Givoly, Hayn, and Natarajan (2007) show that the use of aggregated data 
biases against finding an asymmetric response of earnings to bad news as compared to 
good news.  The authors note that individual economic events (i.e. news) and their impact 
on a firm’s earnings are not directly observable.  Instead, researchers only have access to 
cumulative measures of news and earnings over a period of time (e.g. a year).  The 
authors employ simulation techniques and demonstrate that the use of data which 
aggregates a heterogeneous population can mask the presence of conservatism even when 
the underlying data generating process includes an asymmetric response to bad news as 
compared to good news.   
Additionally, I use measures of news and earnings that have been aggregated 
across firms, i.e. not just across time for individual firms as in Givoly et al. (2007).  This 
additional level of aggregation could further obscure conservatism at the aggregate level 
even if individual firms are reporting conservatively.  For example, earnings-return 
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relation based measures of conservatism often use firm-specific returns as a proxy for 
news (e.g. Basu 1997, Khan and Watts 2009).  However, Vuolteenaho (2002) 
demonstrates that firm-level returns are driven by idiosyncratic cash flow news which is 
largely diversified away in aggregate portfolios.  Additionally, bad news for some firms 
could be good news for other firms due to competition within an industry or due to 
differing firm sensitivities to macroeconomic conditions (Shivakumar 2007).   
Finally, accounting conservatism within the BEA’s measure of aggregate 
corporate profits could be reduced or eliminated as a result of the BEA’s source data and 
construction methods.  The BEA uses proprietary income tax return data in addition to 
publicly available external financial reporting data when constructing its measure of 
aggregate corporate profits.  Firms have less flexibility to make income-decreasing 
accruals for tax reporting as compared to financial reporting (Ball and Shivakumar 2005).  
This reduced flexibility may limit the degree of conditional conservatism within the BEA 
measure of aggregate corporate profits.  Furthermore, the BEA’s aggregation 
methodology involves replacing certain historical cost measures with current cost 
estimates.  These adjustments could reduce the degree of conservatism within aggregate 
corporate profits.  For example, conditionally conservative lower of cost or market 
inventory writedowns are removed from BEA estimates of aggregate corporate profits.1
My results help answer the empirical question of whether conditional 
conservatism extends to the aggregate level by showing that BEA estimates of aggregate 
corporate profits and gross domestic product are more sensitive to negative aggregate 
cash flow news than to positive aggregate cash flow news.  Additionally, my results 
  
The BEA could also adjust estimates of aggregate corporate profits for any bias 
introduced by accounting conservatism.   
1 See Chapter 5 for a detailed description of the BEA’s source data and aggregation methodology. 
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suggest that accounting conservatism’s effect on the measurement attributes of 
macroeconomic fundamentals has the potential to influence monetary policy decisions 
made by the Federal Reserve. 
2.2 Prior Literature – Aggregate Earnings 
My study is related to multiple streams of literature.  My study is most closely 
related to the growing literature which examines the properties of aggregate earnings.  
One prominent set of studies within this literature attempts to determine whether 
documented earnings-return anomalies identified within firm-level earnings also persist 
at the aggregate level.  For example, Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) examine 
whether post-earnings announcement drift exists at the aggregate level.  The authors 
aggregate quarterly returns and earnings for Compustat firms and estimate aggregate 
earnings surprises.  Regressing aggregate returns on the aggregate earnings surprises for 
the past four quarters yields two primary results.  First, the correlations between current 
aggregate returns and aggregate earnings surprises for prior quarters are close to zero.  
This result is inconsistent with post-earnings announcement drift at the aggregate level.  
Second, the authors find a negative contemporaneous relation between aggregate 
earnings surprises and aggregate returns.   
Cready and Gurun (2010) confirm this negative contemporaneous relation 
between aggregate earnings surprises and aggregate returns using short-window tests.  
This negative contemporaneous relation stands in stark contrast to firm-level results and 
is surprising given the theoretical relationships underlying traditional valuation models.  
As an illustration, a firm’s stock price should be equal to the discounted value of the 
firm’s future cash flows.  If earnings serve as informative signals about the firm’s future 
cash flows, then positive earnings surprises should cause investors to raise their 
expectations of the firm’s future cash flows.  Thus, all else equal, the firm’s stock price 
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should rise.  However, the results of Kothari et al. (2006) and Cready and Gurun (2010) 
suggest that unexpectedly high earnings at the aggregate level are associated with 
negative aggregate market returns.   
Recent research has tried to resolve this disconnect between the firm-level and 
aggregate-level results.  Shivakumar (2007) finds evidence that positive aggregate 
earnings surprises lead future inflation.  Therefore, positive aggregate earnings surprises 
could cause investors to increase their expectation about future discount rates.  If this 
increase in investors’ expectations about future discount rates swamps the increase in 
investors’ expectations about future cash flows, then aggregate returns will be negative.  
Similarly, Sadka and Sadka (2009) find that investors can better predict earnings changes 
at the aggregate level than at the firm level.  The authors also find that prices better 
anticipate earnings growth at the aggregate level.  Therefore, aggregate earnings changes 
might provide little or no information about future cash flows because that information 
has already been impounded by investors.  In turn, the contemporaneous earnings-return 
relation moves from a positive correlation at the firm level to a negative correlation at the 
aggregate level because adding firms to the portfolio increases the predictability of 
earnings and reduces the relative importance of cash flow news.  
Finally, Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh (2009) examine whether the accrual anomaly 
extends to the aggregate level.  Similar to previously documented firm-level results, the 
authors find that aggregate accruals are less persistent than aggregate cash flows.  
However, in contrast to results at the firm level (e.g. Sloan 1996), the authors find that 
aggregate accruals are positively associated with future aggregate market returns.  This 
result suggests that the accrual anomaly actually reverses at the aggregate level, which is 
inconsistent with the earnings fixation hypothesis.  Moreover, the authors find that the 
contemporaneous correlation between innovations in aggregate accruals and aggregate 
11
returns is negative.  This result is consistent with the negative contemporaneous relation 
between aggregate earnings changes and aggregate returns identified by Kothari et al. 
(2006) and Cready and Gurun (2010) being driven largely by the accrual component of 
earnings.   
A related set of studies documents the properties of aggregate earnings and further 
examines the relation between aggregate earnings and aggregate returns.  For example, 
Anilowski, Feng, and Skinner (2007) investigate whether earnings guidance issued by 
individual firms collectively affects aggregate stock returns through investors’ estimates 
of aggregate expected future cash flows, expected returns, or both.  The authors find that 
changes in the aggregate proportion of downward guidance are associated with other 
measures of aggregate earnings news constructed from analysts forecasts and time-series 
models.  Thus, aggregate earnings guidance possibly provides timely information about 
the overall corporate sector health and the economy as a whole.  However, the authors 
find no evidence of a relation between aggregate guidance and aggregate returns using 
quarterly measures.  Moreover, while the authors do find a weak association between 
aggregate guidance and aggregate returns using monthly data, the direction of causality is 
unclear.  For example, it is possible that macroeconomic news simultaneously drives 
guidance behavior and aggregate returns rather than aggregate earnings guidance leading 
aggregate returns (Shivakumar 2007).   
Ball, Sadka, and Sadka (2009) use a principal-components analysis to show that 
common earnings factors explain a significant portion of firm-level variation in earnings.  
Said differently, Ball et al. (2009) find common factors in earnings in much the same way 
that Fama and French (1993) identified common factors in returns (e.g. market, size, and 
book-to-market).  Further, the authors find that cross-sectional variation in firms’ returns 
appears to be correlated with firms’ sensitivities to the earnings factors.  These results 
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suggests that earnings shocks across companies have a substantial systematic component 
and that earnings performance is an underlying source of risk that is priced by the market.   
Finally, Jorgensen et al. (2009) examine the properties of aggregate earnings in an 
effort to identify the aggregate valuation effects of changes in accounting standards.  The 
authors perform empirical tests by summing the earnings and operating incomes of all 
firms on Compustat.  The authors find that previously documented firm-level earnings 
attributes disappear in the aggregate.  For example, the authors find no evidence that 
aggregate earnings can predict aggregate cash flows.  The authors also find that the 
relation between aggregate earnings and aggregate returns has remained stable over time 
despite numerous changes in accounting standards.  The authors conclude that the 
informativeness of earnings to a diversified investor is largely unaffected by changes in 
accounting standards and enforcement (i.e. accounting standards are diversifiable).   
I contribute to this literature in multiple ways.  In contrast to the studies above 
which aggregate Compustat data, I examine the time-series behavior of aggregate 
corporate profits compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  This use of BEA data 
has multiple advantages.  First, BEA data aggregates earnings for all firms, both public 
and private, whereas Compustat data only includes the 1% of all firms that are publicly 
traded.  Second, BEA data is available beginning in 1929 while Compustat data is only 
available beginning in 1962, and this longer time series increases the power of the 
empirical tests.  Third, my study identifies links between firm-level earnings and 
macroeconomic variables, which is necessary in order to understand the important and 
complicated relationships between aggregate earnings, aggregate stock market returns, 
and the macroeconomy (Shivakumar 2007).  In this case, my study demonstrates that 
firm-level financial reporting choices can aggregate and influence outputs from the 
national economic accounts including aggregate corporate profits and GDP.     
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2.3 Prior Literature – Accounting Conservatism 
My study is also related to the literature which examines the determinants and 
consequences of firm-level accounting conservatism.  Accounting conservatism is 
typically defined in the empirical accounting literature as the differential verifiability 
required for recognizing gains as compared to losses (Basu 1997, Watts 2003a).  
Evidence of accounting conservatism can be traced as far back as trading partnership 
records from medieval Europe (see Basu 1997 and the citations therein).  However, 
debate persists as to accounting conservatism’s value within a system of external 
financial reporting (Ball and Shivakumar 2005).  In Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concepts No. 8, the Financial Accounting Standards Board does not endorse 
conservatism because conservatism can introduce a downward bias in income and net 
assets that conflicts with certain qualitative characteristics of useful financial information 
including representative faithfulness and neutrality.   However, advocates of accounting 
conservatism counter that conservatism’s long history and survival in the face of criticism 
from standard setters suggests that conservatism has benefits.  Advocates of conservatism 
argue that if conservatism arises endogenously as part of a firm’s solution to its profit 
maximization problem, then eliminating conservatism could constrain the firm and lower 
shareholder welfare (Watts 2003a).   
Basu (1997) provides empirical evidence that firm-level earnings are 
conditionally conservative.  Using firm-level stock returns as a proxy for news, Basu 
(1997) shows that firm-level earnings are more sensitive to bad news than to good news.  
Additionally, Basu (1997) shows that negative earnings changes are more likely to 
reverse in the following period than positive earnings changes.  This result suggests that 
anticipated future bad news is recognized immediately as a transitory negative earnings 
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shock while anticipated future good news is recognized over several future periods as the 
anticipated gains are realized.   
A large subsequent literature attempts to identify the determinants of accounting 
conservatism.  The most common explanation for the existence of conservatism is that 
conservatism facilitates efficient contracting.  In other words, conservatism potentially 
reduces moral hazard problems resulting from interactions between various parties with 
asymmetric information, asymmetric payoffs, limited horizons, and limited liability 
(Watts 2003a).  For example, managers with limited employment horizons and private 
information regarding the firm’s prospects often have the incentive to overstate 
accounting earnings in order to maintain their employment status and meet bonus targets.  
Accounting conservatism may offset the upward bias in earnings and limit the ability of 
managers to hide losses and enrich themselves through opportunistic behavior.  In turn, 
cash remains inside the firm and available for investment rather than being paid to 
management.  Additionally, shareholders and boards of directors may be able to identify 
and remove underperforming managers earlier.  Thus, accounting conservatism can act as 
a governance mechanism (i.e. as a substitute for monitoring) which increases the value of 
the firm and the welfare of shareholders (Watts 2003a).     
Accounting conservatism may also facilitate efficient debt contracting.  For 
example, consider a lender who is considering making a loan to a firm.  The lender likely 
has an asymmetric payoff.  That is, the lender faces losses if the firm’s future cash flows 
are insufficient to cover the interest and principal payments on the loan.  However, the 
lender does not enjoy any additional compensation if the firm’s net assets are above the 
face value of the debt.  The timely loss recognition associated with conservatism could 
provide the lender with earlier signals that the firm’s prospects are deteriorating.  In turn, 
earlier violation of debt covenants should allow debt holders to seize control of the firm 
15
away from the manager at an earlier point in time, thus avoiding any further destruction 
of firm value (Watts 2003a).  Moreover, lenders may provide the firm better terms of 
trade (i.e. a lower interest rate) in exchange for a commitment to a conservative reporting 
regime.2
Additional proposed explanations for accounting conservatism include taxation 
and litigation.  Income taxation potentially leads to conservative reporting because 
profitable firms wish to defer income in an effort to reduce the present value of tax 
payments and increase the value of the firm (Watts 2003a).  The litigation explanation for 
accounting conservatism is based on an asymmetric payoff argument.  If overstating the 
firm’s net assets is more likely to result in lawsuits than understating the firm’s net assets, 
then managers have an incentive to use conservative reporting to reduce the risk of costly 
litigation.  Similarly, auditors face an asymmetric litigation risk.  That is, auditors are less 
likely to face investor lawsuits for forgone gains due to understated net assets and income 
than they are to face lawsuits for losses due to overstated net assets and income.  
Therefore, auditors have an incentive to pressure their clients into a conservative 
reporting regime (Watts 2003a).   
     
Finally, accounting regulation has been proposed as an explanation for the 
existence of accounting conservatism.  Similar to auditors, regulators and standard setters 
likely face asymmetric payoffs.  For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board typically face a great deal of criticism 
after high profile accounting scandals (e.g. Enron).  However, regulator actions which 
prevented other such failures may not be as visible to the public.  Therefore, regulators 
may demand conservatism in order to reduce expected political costs, and standard setters 
have an incentive to promulgate guidance which results in conservative financial 
2 For a challenge to the debt compensation explanation for accounting conservatism, see Gigler, Kanodia, 
Sapra, and Venugopalan (2009). 
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reporting.  For example, while the FASB publicly promotes neutral accounting standards, 
several accounting practices remain conservative (e.g. lower of cost or market inventory 
rules, LIFO inventory valuation, and recognition of contingent liabilities) (Watts 2003a).    
I contribute to this literature in several ways.  First, I demonstrate that the 
summation of individual firm earnings results in a conditionally conservative aggregate 
corporate profits signal.  This result is consistent with the determinants of conservatism 
being positively correlated across firms.  Additionally, because the BEA measure of 
aggregate corporate profits includes all firms and is constructed using both external 
financial reporting and tax data, my results could provide insights on the incentives for 
conservative financial reporting by private firms and by all firms for tax reporting 
purposes.  Finally, my results may help reconcile seemingly opposing views on the net 
benefits of accounting conservatism.  That is, accounting conservatism could be part of 
the optimal financial reporting strategy for individual firms.  However, standard setting 
actions which limit conservatism are not necessarily welfare decreasing if accounting 
conservatism alters the measurement attributes of key macroeconomic indicators and 
imposes an information externality on macroeconomic decision makers. 
2.4 Prior Literature – The Economic Role of Accounting 
Finally, my study is related to the literature which examines the economic role of 
external financial reporting.  In a broad sense, the various topical areas of accounting 
research can all provide insights on how accounting helps solve society’s fundamental 
economic problem of allocating scarce resources to their most efficient uses in an effort 
to maximize social welfare.  For example, a portion of financial accounting research 
attempts to identify cases where investors fail to fully understand the implications of 
accounting information.  Such results are interesting and important because they suggest 
that more efficient resource allocations, and potentially even Pareto welfare 
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improvements, are possible with changes in the information content of earnings or with 
changes in investor decision making.  Similarly, managerial accounting research seeks to 
understand how managers use accounting information to improve decision making and 
resource utilization.  Likewise, auditing research explores topics including whether 
independent verification of external financial reporting data improves the efficiency of 
capital markets.  Lastly, tax and public finance research investigates the economic 
consequences of wealth redistributions when market resource allocations are deemed not 
to be socially optimal.   
More specifically, the accounting literature has identified several non-mutually 
exclusive economic roles of external financial reporting including providing new 
information to investors and facilitating efficient contracting.  Under the information 
perspective, the optimal firm performance measure is a timely earnings variable which 
reflects revisions in investors’ expectations about future cash flows (Ball 2008).  In turn, 
accounting increases the allocative efficiency of the capital market by allowing investors 
to make more informed consumption and investment decisions (see Kothari 2001 for a 
review).  The optimal earnings variable under the contracting perspective summarizes 
verifiable short-term outcomes associated with managerial actions and efforts 
(Holthausen and Watts 2001).  In exchange for a contractible variable that summarizes 
the firm’s ability to meet its contractual obligations, contracting parties agree to grant the 
firm better terms of trade (Ball 2001).  Thus, under the contracting perspective, 
accounting serves to increase the efficiency of the firms themselves.   
In addition to providing new information to investors and facilitating efficient 
contracting, accounting also disciplines managers’ disclosure behavior (Gigler and 
Hemmer 1998) and improves managerial decision making (Waymire 2009).  Each of 
accounting’s multiple economic roles ultimately helps allocate society’s scarce resources 
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towards (away) from firms and projects with the highest (lowest) net present value.  I 
contribute to this literature by showing that accounting also has the potential to affect 
social welfare outside of a market setting by influencing the measurement of key 
macroeconomic indicators and shaping monetary policy decisions which regulate the 
aggregate money supply and alter the growth of the macroeconomy.  Thus, accounting’s 
importance in maximizing social welfare by allocating scarce resources to their most 
efficient uses may be of a higher order than previously thought (i.e. “accounting 
matters”).   
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Chapter 3:  Empirical Design – Accounting Conservatism and 
Macroeconomic Indicators 
3.1 Conservatism and Macroeconomic Indicators – Empirical Overview 
My empirical tests are designed to identify whether firm-level accounting 
conservatism influences the measurement attributes of key macroeconomic indicators and 
affects monetary policy decisions.  I begin by investigating whether firm-level 
conditional conservatism aggregates to influence the measurement of aggregate corporate 
profits.  My empirical tests focus on conditional (i.e. ex-post or news dependent) 
conservatism rather than unconditional (i.e. ex-ante or news independent) conservatism 
for two primary reasons.  First, the national economic accounting system does not 
produce an aggregate corporate sector analog to an individual firm’s balance sheet.  
Second, measurements of the combined market value of the entire U.S. corporate sector 
(i.e. both public and private firms) are unavailable.  Hence, examining unconditional 
conservatism using traditional market-to-book measures is extremely difficult at the 
macroeconomic level.3
In order to assess conditional conservatism’s influence on the measurement of 
aggregate corporate profits, I adapt Basu’s (1997) firm-level asymmetric timeliness 
regression to accommodate aggregate-level time-series data as follows.  First, I use the 
time-series of annual aggregate corporate profits from 1929 to 2007 compiled by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis as the numerator for the dependent earnings variable.  
Second, I scale aggregate corporate profits by a BEA estimate of aggregate fixed assets 
owned by public and private firms.
   
4
3 See Beaver and Ryan (2005) for further discussion of the differences between conditional and 
unconditional conservatism.   
  Lastly, I require a proxy for news about aggregate 
4 Basu (1997) deflates firm-level earnings in the cross-section to reduce heteroskedasticity.  In contrast, the 
primary purpose of deflating the time series of aggregate corporate profits is to reduce any non-stationarity 
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corporate sector fundamentals in order to determine whether aggregate corporate profits 
are more sensitive to negative news than to positive news (i.e. whether aggregate 
corporate profits are conditionally conservative).  I form proxies for aggregate corporate 
sector news using Campbell’s (1991) return decomposition framework.   
Campbell’s (1991) return decomposition framework is advantageous in my 
setting because it distinguishes between aggregate cash flow news and aggregate discount 
rate news.  Vuolteenaho (2002) demonstrates that firm-level returns are driven primarily 
by cash flow news.  Therefore, bifurcating returns into cash flow and discount rate news 
may not be critical within firm-level conservatism studies (e.g. Basu 1997).  However, 
prior research demonstrates that cash flow news explains less than one-third of the 
variation in returns at the aggregate level (Campbell 1991, Campbell and Vuolteenaho 
2004).  This suggests that cash flow news is largely idiosyncratic and diversified away in 
the aggregate (Vuolteenaho 2002).  Thus, failing to distinguish between cash flow news 
and discount rate news at the aggregate level could significantly reduce the power of the 
empirical tests. 
3.2 Cash Flow and Discount Rate News – Theory 
Campbell’s (1991) return decomposition framework utilizes a rational 
expectations model which relates unexpected aggregate stock returns to changes in 
investors’ expectations about future cash flows and discount rates.  The model builds 
upon the dividend-price ratio model of Campbell and Shiller (1988) which defines the 
return on an asset (e.g. a stock or a portfolio of stocks) as follows:  
  
in the dependent variable.  Using lagged fixed assets as a scalar could also mitigate artificial overstatement 
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Where rt denotes the gross log return on the asset from the beginning of time t to 
the beginning of time t+1, Pt is the real price of the asset at the end of time t, and Dt is the 
real dividend paid on the asset during period t.  Equation (1) contains a non-linear 
relationship because it involves the log of the sum.  However, Campbell and Shiller 
(1988) show that rt can be approximated using a first-order Taylor expansion of Equation 
(1) which yields the following: 
1)1( −−−++≅ tttt pdpkr ρρ        (2) 
Where k is a constant resulting from the approximation, ρ  is a constant discount 
rate slightly less than one which implies that an increase in expected returns (i.e. discount 
rates) in the distant future is associated with a smaller drop in today’s stock price than an 
increase in expected returns in the near future, and lowercase letters denote the logs of the 
corresponding uppercase letters.   
Campbell (1991) shows that solving Equation (2) forward for price, imposing a 
terminal condition that prevents the log dividend-price ratio from growing explosively, 
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Where [ ]tE  denotes an expectation at time t, and [ ] [ ] [ ]1−−=∆ ttt EEE .  Under 
rational expectations, Equation (3) requires unexpected stock returns to be associated 
with changes in expectations about cash flows or changes in expectations about future 
discount rates.  In other words, an unexpectedly high (low) current period return implies 
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that investors raised (lowered) their expectations about future cash flows, lowered 
(raised) their expectations about future discount rates, or both during the period.   
3.3 Cash Flow and Discount Rate News – Empirical Estimation 
Because revisions in investors’ expectations about future cash flows and discount 
rates in Equation (3) are not directly observable, Campbell (1991) forms empirical 
proxies using a vector autoregression (VAR).  A vector autoregression is an econometric 
model that generalizes univariate auto regressive (AR) models and captures the 
interdependencies between multiple time series.  Each variable within the system is 
allowed to evolve in an unrestricted fashion as a linear function of its own lags and the 
lags of all the other variables in the model.  As a result, vector autoregressions can be 
estimated without the specification of a structural model which can require multiple 
identification restrictions.  Campbell’s (1991) first-order vector autoregression assumes 
the following functional form: 
ttt uzaz +Γ+= −1         (4) 
Where zt is an mx1 vector of macroeconomic state variables observable to the 
market by the end of period t, a is an mx1 vector of constant parameters, Γ is an mxm 
matrix of coefficient estimates, and ut is an mx1 vector of independent and identically 
distributed residuals.  Campbell (1991) demonstrates that revisions in investors’ 
expectations about future cash flows (CFNews) and revisions in investors’ expectations 
about future discount rates (DRNews) can be approximated as follows: 
tt uIeeCFNews ))(11(
1−Γ−Γ′+′= ρρ       (5a) 
tt uIeDRNews
1)(1*1 −Γ−Γ′−= ρρ       (5b) 
Where 1e  is an mx1 vector whose first element is one and all other elements are 
zero, and I is an identity matrix of size m.  Positive values of CFNewst (DRNewst) denote 
good news, i.e. an increase (decrease) in investors’ expectations about future cash flows 
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(discount rates).  Similarly, negative values of CFNewst (DRNewst) denote bad news, i.e. 
a decrease (increase) in investors’ expectations about future cash flows (discount rates).   
The intuition behind the framework is that each state variable realization can be 
decomposed into an expected component and an innovation component.  For example, 
aggregate stock returns are decomposed into an expected component (i.e. risk) and an 
innovation component (i.e. news).  The remaining state variables, which serve as discount 
rate proxies, are also decomposed into expected and innovation components.  The 
correlation between unexpected returns and innovations in the discount rate proxies can 
be used to estimate the portion of current period unexpected returns that is due to current 
period innovations in the discount rate proxies (i.e. discount rate news).  The residual 
current period unexpected return is attributed to cash flow news in order to avoid directly 
modeling seasonal dividend payments (Campbell 1991).5
I implement Campbell’s (1991) VAR methodology using four monthly state 
variables (i.e. m=4).  First, I include the excess of the monthly return on the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) value weighted index over the risk-free rate 
(XRET).  Second, I include the default spread (DEF) defined as the difference between 
the yield on a portfolio of seasoned BAA corporate bonds and the yield on seasoned 
AAA corporate bonds as measured by Moody’s.  The intuition behind DEF is that the 
default spread is counter-cyclical and forecasts high (low) returns when economic 
conditions are weak (strong) (Fama and French 1989).  Next, I add the log of the 12-
month trailing price-to-earnings ratio on the S&P 500 index (PE) because a high (low) 
price-to-earnings ratio implies low (high) discount rates if earnings growth is held 
   
5 By directly modeling discount rate news and defining cash flow news as the residual, the cash flow news 
term inherits any error from misspecification of discount rate news (see Chen and Zhao 2009 and Ball, 
Sadka, and Sadka 2009).  However, any estimation error within my proxy for aggregate cash flow news 
biases against finding that aggregate corporate profits are more sensitive to negative aggregate cash flow 
news than to positive aggregate cash flow news.   
24
constant (Campbell and Vuolteenaho 2004).  Finally, I include the small stock value 
spread (VALUE) which is the difference between the logs of the book-to-market ratios of 
small high book-to-market stocks and small low book-to-market stocks.  The intuition 
behind VALUE is that high returns to small growth stocks potentially forecasts low 
aggregate stock returns because (1) small growth stocks generate cash flows farther in the 
future and are more sensitive to discount rate shocks or (2) small growth firms are more 
dependent on external financing and sensitive to equity market conditions (Campbell and 
Vuolteenaho 2004).   
3.4 Identifying Conditional Conservatism within Macroeconomic Indicators 
I combine the aggregate-level BEA data and proxies for aggregate corporate 
sector news in the following regression to determine whether the time-series of aggregate 
corporate profits exhibits conditional conservatism: 
CPt / FAPrivatet-1 = θ0 + θ1CFNewst + θ2CFNegt + θ3CFNewst*CFNegt + μt      (6) 
Where CPt denotes aggregate corporate profits in calendar year t as compiled by 
the BEA, FAPrivatet-1 represents the net fixed assets owned by all public and private 
businesses in calendar year t-1 as estimated by the BEA, CFNewst is the sum of monthly 
cash flow shocks in calendar year t from the VAR system, CFNegt is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if CFNewst < 0, and CFNegt equals 0 otherwise.  A positive and significant 
θ3 coefficient in Model (6) would indicate that aggregate corporate profits are more 
sensitive to negative aggregate cash flow news than to positive cash flow news, 
consistent with the existence of conditional conservatism at the aggregate level.6
6 My empirical tests focus on the response of aggregate corporate profits to aggregate cash flow news 
because earnings are meant to provide investors with information about the magnitude, timing, and 
uncertainty of future cash flows.  Inference remains unchanged when including controls for aggregate 
discount rate news (results untabulated).   
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Because aggregate corporate profits are a significant component of gross domestic 
product, I next investigate whether accounting conservatism alters the measurement 
attributes of GDP signals by estimating the following time-series regression: 
GDPt / FATotalt-1 = θ0 + θ1CFNewst + θ2CFNegt + θ3CFNewst*CFNegt + μt      (7) 
Where GDPt denotes nominal gross domestic product in year t, and FATotalt-1 
represents the net fixed assets owned by public and private businesses, non-profit 
institutions, and governments in year t-1.  A positive and significant θ3 coefficient in 
Model (7) would indicate that GDP measurements are more sensitive to negative 
aggregate cash flow news than to positive aggregate cash flow news. 
There are two features of note regarding Models (6) and (7).  First, Models (6) 
and (7) are incomplete specifications for aggregate corporate profits and gross domestic 
product, respectively.  For example, neither specification includes explicit controls for 
macroeconomic conditions, and measurements of aggregate corporate profits and gross 
domestic product are likely higher (lower) during macroeconomic expansions 
(contractions).  However, the purpose of Models (6) and (7) is to determine whether the 
macroeconomic signals are more sensitive to bad news as compared to good news.  
Importantly, news is uncorrelated with all other variables known at time t by definition.  
Therefore, the omission of possible control variables does not generate omitted correlated 
variable bias within the parameter estimates provided my proxies for news are well 
specified.   
Second, Models (6) and (7) are macroeconomic analogs to Basu’s (1997) 
asymmetric timeliness regression.  A number of studies document concerns with the Basu 
(1997) approach at the firm level.  For example, Beaver and Ryan (2005) and Givoly et 
al. (2007) show that the Basu (1997) measure can be negatively correlated with other 
proxies for conservatism.  Additionally, Dietrich et al. (2007) and Beaver et al. (2010) 
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find that test statistics can be misspecified due to endogeneity within the earnings-return 
relation.   
However, I contend that my aggregate-level tests yield valid and useful 
inferences.  Despite the limitations described above, Ryan (2006) asserts that asymmetric 
timeliness is still the most direct implication of conditional conservatism.7  Moreover, 
endogeneity is likely to be less of a concern at the aggregate level because the 
information within earnings releases for the individual firms is available to the market 
before the release of the aggregate BEA signal.8  Finally, as a practical matter, using 
alternate measures of conservatism is difficult due to the limits of the aggregate-level 
data.  For example, the aggregate-level data published by the BEA is not conducive to 
adapting firm-level measures of conditional conservatism which require accruals 
information, book-to-market data, or other detailed financial statement line items.9
7 See also Ball, Kothari, and Nikolaev (2010) for an econometric defense of the Basu (1997) approach.   
  
8 See also Ball and Shivakumar (2008) who find that information in earnings announcements can explain 
only a small fraction of firm-level returns, suggesting that reverse causality is not a first-order concern.   
9 See Penman and Zhang (2002), Roychowdhury and Watts (2007), Givoly et al. (2007), Callen, Segal, and 
Hope (2010), Khan and Watts (2009), and Caskey and Peterson (2010). 
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Chapter 4:  Empirical Design – Accounting Conservatism and 
Monetary Policy 
4.1 Federal Reserve Overview 
The remainder of the empirical tests examine whether accounting conservatism 
influences monetary policy decisions made by the Federal Reserve.  The Federal Reserve 
was formed in 1913 after a series of bank failures, financial panics, business 
bankruptcies, and economic downturns eroded the public’s confidence in the U.S. 
financial system.  The Federal Reserve has many duties including conducting monetary 
policy, supervising and regulating banks, maintaining the stability of the financial system, 
containing systemic risk within financial markets, operating the nation’s payments 
system, and providing certain financial services to the U.S. government and foreign 
official institutions.  For a complete overview of the Federal Reserve, see the 2002 Fed 
publication entitled “The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions”.   
The Federal Reserve is an independent central bank.  In other words, Fed 
decisions do not have to be ratified by any member of the executive branch of the 
government.  However, the Federal Reserve System is subject to oversight by the U.S. 
Congress who has the power to coin money and set its value according to the 
Constitution.  The Federal Reserve System consists of the Board of Governors in 
Washington D.C. and twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks in various cities across the 
country.  The Board of Governors consists of seven members appointed by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate for a term of fourteen years.  The Chairman and Vice 
Chairman positions are also appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a 
term of four years.   
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The Federal Reserve’s mandate from the U.S. Congress under Section 2a of the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 is to “promote effectively the goals of maximum 
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”  In the long run, price 
stability should help maximize employment and output by allowing prices to serve as 
clear signals for efficient resource allocation without distortions from inflation.  
Additionally, stable prices encourage saving and capital formation and prevent the 
erosion of asset prices due to unanticipated inflation.  However, the Federal Reserve 
often faces short-term tradeoffs when attempting to satisfy its dual mandate.  For 
example, supply shocks (e.g. a poor agricultural harvest or a disruption in the supply of 
oil) can simultaneously put upward pressure on prices and downward pressure on output 
and employment.  In such cases, the Fed can choose to raise interest rates in order diffuse 
price pressure at the expense of reduced output and inflation.  Alternatively, the Fed 
could choose an accommodative stance which fosters growth but risks an inflationary 
spiral (e.g. where the public demands higher wages in expectation of higher prices and a 
self-fulfilling prophecy results).   
The Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy and influences both output and 
prices using three major tools.  First, the Fed conducts open market operations, which 
consists of buying and selling securities in the open market in order to influence the level 
of reserves in the depository system.  Second, the Board of Governors sets the reserve 
requirement, which is the percentage of funds that banks and depository institutions must 
hold in reserve against customer deposits.  Third, the Federal Reserve operates the 
discount window where commercial banks can borrow directly from the Fed at a discount 
rate set by their regional Federal Reserve Bank and approved by the Board of Governors.   
4.2 Monetary Policy Overview 
29
The Federal Reserve’s monetary policy tools influence macroeconomic conditions 
through the supply and demand of bank reserves.  The demand for reserves consists of 
required reserves and excess reserves.  Required reserves for each bank in the U.S. are a 
function of the bank’s deposits and the reserve ratio set by the Board of Governors.  
Banks can hold required reserves in the form of vault cash or balances in accounts with 
the regional Federal Reserve Bank for their district.  Revisions to the reserve ratio are 
infrequent, and thus required reserves in the system fluctuate mainly with the aggregate 
level of bank deposits.  Banks also use their accounts at their regional Federal Reserve 
Bank to clear many financial transactions.  Because the level of clearing transactions can 
vary widely, banks typically carry excess reserves at their regional Federal Reserve Bank.   
The Federal Reserve supplies reserves through the discount window and open 
market operations.  Banks are generally hesitant to borrow directly from the Fed’s 
discount window because such activity could be seen as a sign of weakness if the activity 
is found out by the public.  As a result, the majority of the supply of reserves comes from 
non-borrowed reserves.  The Fed manages the level of non-borrowed reserves through 
open market operations.  Open market operations are overseen by the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) which meets eight times per year.  The FOMC consists of 
the Board of Governors, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and 
presidents of four other Federal Reserve Banks who serve on a rotating basis.   
The FOMC can increase the level of non-borrowed reserves by instructing the 
Domestic Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to purchase securities 
in the over-the-counter market.  When purchasing securities, the Fed writes a check to the 
seller of securities (e.g. a private company issuing bonds or the U.S. government issuing 
Treasury bills).  The seller then deposits the check into its local bank, and the local bank 
will present the check to the Fed for payment.  In lieu of actual cash payment to the 
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seller’s bank, the Fed increases the bank’s reserve account at its regional Federal Reserve 
Bank.  As a result, the level of reserves for the seller’s bank has increased without a 
decrease in reserves elsewhere.  Thus, the overall level of non-borrowed reserves in the 
system has increased.  Just the opposite occurs when the FOMC sells securities (i.e. total 
non-borrowed reserves decrease because the payment from the buyer reduces the reserves 
at the buyer’s bank without an increase elsewhere).   
Banks and depository institutions are also able to trade their reserves.  Banks with 
excess reserves often loan reserves to banks whose reserves fall short of the required 
amount.  These loans are typically overnight loans, and the rate of interest on these loans 
is known as the federal funds rate.  The Federal Reserve does not unilaterally set the 
federal funds rate.  Instead, the federal funds rate changes in response to the supply and 
demand of reserves.  For example, consider when the press reports that the Federal 
Reserve has increased interest rates.  In reality, the FOMC has only increased a target rate 
for the federal funds rate (i.e. a target for the price of reserves).  The FOMC will instruct 
the Domestic Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to sell securities in 
order to reduce the supply of reserves.  In turn, banks will find it more expensive to 
borrow reserves from other banks.  As a result, the federal funds rate will increase and 
approach the target rate until a new equilibrium is reached where the sum of required and 
excess reserves equals the sum of borrowed and non-borrowed reserves. 
Monetary policy has real macroeconomic effects when changes in the federal 
funds rate affect other interest rates, foreign exchange rates, employment, output, and 
prices.  For example, if the Federal Reserve reduces the supply of reserves in order to 
curb inflation, then the resulting increase in the federal funds rate can lead to increases in 
other short-term interest rates on bank loans, Treasury bills, and commercial paper.  The 
increase in short-term rates can also translate into increases in long-term rates on 
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mortgages, corporate bonds, and Treasury bonds.  In turn, demand will decrease for 
residential housing and durable goods.  Moreover, higher interest rates lower the 
cumulative value of investors’ stocks, bonds, and real estate which can further depress 
aggregate consumption.  Finally, changes in interest rates can impact foreign exchange 
rates.  All else equal, higher interest rates in the United States make U.S. dollar 
denominated debt relatively more attractive to lenders.  In turn, demand for U.S. dollars 
will increase.  The increased strength of the U.S. dollar will make imports cheaper for 
Americans, and the price of U.S. produced goods will increase for consumers in other 
countries.   
4.3 Monetary Policy Rules 
As described previously, the Federal Reserve’s mandate from the U.S. Congress 
is to promote maximum employment while maintaining stable prices.  Academic 
monetary policy research often requires translation of the Fed’s dual mandate into a 
formal objective function.  Academic research typically characterizes the central banker’s 
problem as the use of some instrument (e.g. an interest rate) together with knowledge of 
the state of the economy (e.g. the level of prices and output) to stabilize output and prices 
along some optimal path (Cecchetti 1998).  For example, a generalized quadratic central 
banker loss function can be written as: 






















1 )1( ααβ    (8) 
Where pt is the aggregate price level, yt represents aggregate output, p* and y* are 
the desired levels for prices and output, β is the discount factor, h is the horizon, α is the 
relative weight given to squared price and output deviations from their desired paths, and 
E is the expectation operator conditional on the information available at time t.  As 
illustrated in Equation (8), the central banker wishes to minimize the discounted squared 
deviations of prices and output from their optimal paths.  The central banker’s problem is 
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difficult because it is generally not possible to stabilize both output and prices in practice 
(e.g. lowering interest rates can increase output but also lead to inflation).  Thus, central 
bankers are often forced to make choices between variability in output and variability in 
prices.   
Specifying the optimal levels of output (y*) and prices (p*) can yield a policy rule, 
i.e. a systematic rule for adjusting a policy instrument as the state of the economy 
fluctuates.  Researchers often formulate policy rules by first constructing complex models 
of the macroeconomy which specify household utility functions, firm production 
functions, and market imperfections (e.g. wage rigidities) that cause monetary policy 
actions to have real effects.  Researchers can then generate proposed optimal levels of 
output and prices by either fitting the model to historical data or by parameterizing the 
model using econometric simulations.  See Taylor (1999) for an in-depth review of 
various macroeconomic models and policy rules.   
Perhaps the most prominent monetary policy rule is outlined in Taylor (1993).  
Taylor’s (1993) linear policy rule is formed by applying optimization techniques to a 
linear stochastic macroeconomic model characterized by rational expectations and price 
rigidities.  Taylor’s (1993) original monetary policy rule is as follows: 
2)2(5.5. +−++= pypr        (9) 
Where r is the federal funds rate, p is the rate of inflation, and y is the output gap.  
The output gap is the difference between potential GDP (i.e. GDP at full employment) 
and real GDP.  Reaction functions or policy rules that model the federal funds rate as a 
function of the output gap and inflation are commonly referred to as “Taylor rules.”  The 
policy rule suggests that the federal funds rate could be set mechanically based on 
realizations or forecasts of inflation and the output gap.  Thus, in the strictest possible 
sense, human discretion and the Federal Open Market Committee could be eliminated in 
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favor of a publicly available algorithm (i.e. a computer) which sets the federal funds rate.  
See Kozicki (1999), Taylor (1999), and Orphanides (2003) for a review of the 
development and performance of Taylor rules and for a discussion of the costs and 
benefits of using mechanical policy rules in practice.   
Taylor initially meant his monetary policy rule as a normative prescription for 
monetary policy (Taylor 2007).  More importantly, Taylor (1993) showed that the rule 
was empirically descriptive of actual monetary policy over his sample period.  Taylor’s 
(1993) primary evidence was a visual plot (i.e. not a regression) which showed that the 
actual federal funds rate closely approximated the proposed optimal federal funds rate 
using gross domestic product and inflation realizations and the formula in Equation (9).  
Subsequent research suggests that the relationship continues to hold out of sample 
(Taylor 2007).  These results are consistent with the Fed acting as if it follows the Taylor 
rule.  These results are provocative because presumably the Federal Reserve has an 
immense amount of data regarding the current state of the economy at its disposal when 
making monetary policy decisions.  However, Taylor (1993) suggests that an observer 
only needs two parameters (inflation and output) to accurately predict Fed behavior.  This 
result is significant because the “black box” of monetary policy had previously been 
compared to the mystique of papal successions (Asso et al. 2007).   
4.4 The Dollar Value Impact of Accounting Conservatism 
Importantly for my study, Taylor (1993) empirically demonstrates that the FOMC 
utilizes GDP measurements when setting the federal funds rate.  Moreover, as described 
in Chapter 3, firm-level accounting conservatism may aggregate to influence the 
measurement attributes of aggregate corporate profits and gross domestic product.  
Therefore, accounting conservatism may influence federal funds rate decisions by 
altering the GDP measurements upon which the FOMC relies.  For example, a central 
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banker who observes a low realization of GDP could be unsure as to whether increased 
firm-level accounting conservatism is exacerbating the apparent weakness in 
macroeconomic fundamentals. 
In order to determine whether accounting conservatism influences FOMC 
decisions, I first estimate the dollar value impact of firm-level accounting conservatism 
on measurements of aggregate corporate profits and GDP.  Directly estimating 
accounting conservatism’s dollar value impact on aggregate corporate profits in a given 
year is problematic because my sample consists of only 79 observations.  Therefore, I use 
a two-step procedure to maximize statistical power.  First, I measure the degree of 
accounting conservatism within firm-level earnings each year by estimating annual cross-
sectional specifications of the Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness regression: 
tititititititi NegRNegRMVEX ,,,3,2,101,, */ δαααα ++++=−   (10) 
Where Xi,t denotes firm i’s income before extraordinary items (Compustat item ib) 
in fiscal year t, MVEi,t-1 denotes firm i’s market value of equity defined as common shares 
outstanding (Compustat item csho) multiplied by stock price (Compustat item prcc_f) 
each as of the end of fiscal year t-1, Ri,t is firm i’s buy-and-hold return in year t, Negi,t is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if Ri,t < 0, and Negi,t equals 0 otherwise.   
Next, I estimate the following time-series regression to determine how scaled 
aggregate corporate profits are affected by the degree of accounting conservatism within 
the cross-section of firm-level earnings in a given year:   
CPt / FAPrivatet-1 = Φ0 + Φ1NewsSenst + Φ2LossRecogt + Φ3FirmConst + 
Φ4NBERt + νt           (11) 
Where NewsSenst is the sensitivity of firm-level earnings to news in year t defined 
as the α1 coefficient in year t obtained from annual cross-sectional estimations of the 
Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness regression outlined in Model (10).  LossRecogt is a 
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measure of the timeliness with which the cross-section of firm-level earnings recognizes 
economic losses in year t defined as the α2 coefficient in year t obtained from annual 
estimations of Model (10).  FirmConst represents the incremental sensitivity of firm-level 
earnings to bad news as compared to good news in year t defined as the α3 coefficient in 
year t obtained from annual estimations of Model (10).  Finally, NBERt is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if a recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research occurred at any time during calendar year t, and NBERt equals 0 otherwise. 
The intuition behind Model (11) is as follows.  FirmConst is the Basu (1997) 
asymmetric timeliness measure which captures the degree of conditional conservatism 
within the cross-section of firm-level earnings in year t.  The Φ3 coefficient then maps 
from a measure of firm-level accounting conservatism in year t into a measure of 
accounting conservatism within scaled aggregate corporate profits in year t.  A negative 
Φ3 coefficient would suggest that scaled aggregate corporate profits are lower when firm-
level earnings are more conservative.   
I keep the fitted value from Model (11) restricting the FirmConst variable to equal 





, represents the predicted value of 
scaled aggregate corporate profits in year t if firm-level earnings were not conditionally 
conservative.  Multiplying by FAPrivatet-1 removes the effect of the fixed asset scalar and 
generates an estimate of aggregate corporate profits in year t if firm-level earnings were 
not conditionally conservative (CPt*).  Subtracting observed aggregate corporate profits 
from CPt* yields an estimate of the year t dollar value impact of firm-level accounting 
conservatism on measurements of aggregate corporate profits and GDP (CONSt): 
CONSt = CPt* - CPt        (12) 
CONSt is converted from nominal year t dollars into year 2000 dollars using the 
implicit GDP deflator.  Larger positive values denote a greater dollar value impact (e.g. a 
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CONSt value of 100 indicates that aggregate corporate profits and GDP would have been 
approximately $100 Billion higher in the absence of firm-level accounting conservatism).   
4.5 Monetary Policy Reaction Functions 
Next, I estimate a series of monetary policy reaction functions in order to 
determine whether accounting conservatism’s dollar value impact on measurements of 
macroeconomic fundamentals affects federal funds rate decisions.  As described 
previously, a monetary policy reaction function is a macroeconomics tool that empirically 
links a policy instrument (e.g. the federal funds rate) with measurements of a central 
banker’s objectives (e.g. inflation, GDP, unemployment) (Chappell et al. 1993).  
Following Taylor (1993), my baseline reaction function models the federal funds rate as a 
function of inflation and the output gap and assumes the following form: 
FEDFUNDSt = β0 + β1GAP1t + β2INFt + β3VOLCKERt + β4POSTVOLCKERt + εt    (13a) 
Where FEDFUNDSt is the weighted average of the nominal federal funds rate in 
year t.  GAP1t is a measure of the output gap in year t defined as GDPPotentialt - GDPt.  
GDPPotentialt is an estimate of potential GDP in year t measured in year 2000 dollars 
from the Congressional Budget Office.  GDPt is the BEA estimate of GDP in year t 
which has been converted from nominal year t dollars into year 2000 dollars using the 
BEA’s implicit GDP deflator.  INFt is a measure of inflation in year t calculated as the 
percentage change in the implicit GDP deflator from year t-1 to year t.10
10 Presumably the Fed makes monetary policy decisions based on the current state of the economy and on 
expectations about the future.  However, the Fed’s real-time data and internal forecasts are generally 
proprietary.  Romer and Romer (2000) and Sims (2002) show that the Fed’s internal forecasts (i.e. the 
“Green Book”) are high quality predictors of ex-post realizations.  Thus, researchers usually rely on ex-post 
realizations to proxy for Fed perceptions about the state of the economy when decisions are made 
(Orphanides 2004).   
  VOLCKERt and 
POSTVOLCKERt are fixed effect variables that control for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity in the process by which the federal funds rate is set across Fed regimes.  
VOLCKERt (POSTVOLCKERt) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Paul Volcker (Alan 
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Greenspan or Ben Bernanke) was the Chairman of the Federal Reserve in year t, and 
VOLCKERt (POSTVOLCKERt) equals 0 otherwise.   
A negative β1 coefficient would suggest that the Fed maintains a lower federal 
funds rate in the presence of a large output gap (i.e. an economy that is operating below 
its sustainable level).  Conversely, a positive β2 coefficient would suggest that the Fed 
sets a higher federal funds rate during times of higher inflation.  Positive (negative) 
coefficients on the VOLCKERt or POSTVOLCKERt variables would suggest the federal 
funds rate was systematically higher (lower) during the Volcker or post-Volcker eras 
compared to the pre-Volcker era, irrespective of macroeconomic conditions.   
Next, I modify the baseline reaction function in order to incorporate accounting 
conservatism’s dollar value impact on GDP measurements as follows:   
FEDFUNDSt = Ψ0 + Ψ1GAP2t + Ψ2INFt + Ψ3CONSt + Ψ4VOLCKERt + 
Ψ5POSTVOLCKERt + ηt            (13b) 
Where GAP2t is a measure of the output gap adjusted for the impact of accounting 
conservatism defined as GDPPotentialt - (GDPt + CONSt), and CONSt is the estimate of 
the dollar value impact of accounting conservatism on GDP measurements as described 
by Equation (12).  A negative Ψ3 coefficient would suggest that the federal funds rate 
tends to be lower when the dollar value impact of firm-level accounting conservatism on 
GDP estimates is larger.  
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Chapter 5:  Data 
All data used in this study are publicly available.  Estimates of aggregate 
corporate profits, aggregate fixed assets, and gross domestic product are obtained from 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.  All BEA data used in this study are available at 
www.bea.gov.  I use the latest available estimates for all empirical tests in order to 
minimize noise arising from estimation error.  My empirical tests employ annual 
estimates (rather than quarterly estimates) for three reasons.  First, certain source data is 
only available on an annual basis, and the BEA must employ statistical extrapolation and 
make complicated seasonal adjustments to construct quarterly estimates (BEA 2008).  
Second, the source data underlying quarterly estimates are not as reliable as the source 
data underlying annual estimates (BEA 2008).  Finally, annual data is available beginning 
in 1929 while quarterly data is only available beginning in 1946 (BEA 2002).   
5.1 Overview of National Income and Product Accounts 
Aggregate corporate profits and gross domestic product measurements are part of 
the BEA’s National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).  The National Income and 
Product Accounts are designed primarily to summarize the value and composition of U.S. 
national output and the incomes generated in the production of that output (BEA 2007a).  
Moreover, information contained with the National Income and Product Accounts can be 
used to summarize the sources and uses of national income as well as the sources of 
saving for investment in future production. 
Prior to the development of the National Income and Product Accounts, policy 
makers during the Great Depression faced incomplete and fragmented economic data 
(e.g. freight car loadings) when attempting to combat the Great Depression (BEA 2000).  
In response, the Commerce Department commissioned the development of a system of 
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national income accounts in the 1930s.  The system was expanded in the 1940s in 
response to the planning needs of World War II and again in the late 1950s and early 
1960s in response to the increasing popularity of Keynesian economics.  Accelerating 
inflation in the late 1960s and 1970s led to the development of new price and inflation-
adjusted output measures.  The National Income and Product Accounts have continued to 
develop over time in response to the internationalization of trade and the increasing use 
of technology.  Today, the National Income and Product Accounts are widely used in 
macroeconomics research, and their development has been called one of the greatest 
inventions of the 20th century (BEA 2000). 
The National Income and Product Accounts, along with industry input-output (I-
O) accounts prepared by the BEA and flow of funds accounts prepared by the Federal 
Reserve Board, form the primary elements of today’s U.S. national economic accounting 
system.  The system of U.S. economic accounts is designed to present a coherent, 
comprehensive, and consistent gauge of national economic activity (BEA 2008).  Other 
secondary elements of the U.S. national economic accounting system include the 
international accounts (e.g. the balance of payments and international investment position 
accounts), the regional accounts (e.g. gross domestic product by state, personal income 
by state, and local area personal income), and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates 
of productivity for the U.S. economy.   
The 2008 publication “Concepts and Methods of the U.S. National Income and 
Product Accounts” outlines the BEA’s conceptual framework.  The BEA’s conceptual 
framework is based on the System of National Accounts, an internationally accepted 
conceptual framework for the compilation of national statistics formulated in 1993 (BEA 
2007a).  Financial accounting predates the practice of national economic accounting, 
which has led national economic accounting to be based on many of the same 
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fundamental principles adopted in financial accounting (BEA 2007a).  For example, both 
systems are based on double-entry and accrual principles.  However, differences between 
the two fields exist.  For example, financial accounting practice often values assets at 
historical costs because historical costs are regarded as objective, verifiable, and 
relatively conservative.  In contrast, national economic accounting employs more current 
cost estimates because they serve as the best approximation to the economic notion of 
opportunity costs (i.e. the foregone benefits that could have been secured with the next 
best alternative use of an asset). 
The BEA considers four characteristics when constructing estimates for the 
National Income and Product Accounts (BEA 2008).  First, the BEA strives for accuracy 
(i.e. for estimates that closely measure the underlying theoretical construct).  Second, the 
BEA desires reliability (i.e. small and infrequent revisions to initial estimates).  Third, the 
BEA pushes for relevancy (i.e. for timely estimates that help answer questions about the 
pace of production, the relation between the trade deficit and economic growth, and the 
pattern of spending on goods and services).  Finally, the BEA attempts to maintain 
integrity (i.e. estimates are designed to reflect the best methods and judgments without 
political or other outside influences).   
Similar to the Financial Accounting Standard Board’s own conceptual framework, 
the BEA has formalized definitions for assets (i.e. anything owned by some unit from 
which economic benefits are derived by their owners by holding or using them) and 
income (i.e. the amount arising from current production that an entity can spend without 
reducing its net worth).  The BEA has also defined the production boundary (i.e. which 
human activities are defined as production), geographic boundaries (e.g. whether to 
measure the value of goods and services produced by labor and capital located in the 
United States or by U.S. residents regardless of location), differences between gross and 
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net measures (i.e. whether or not measures include a charge for depreciation), and saving 
(i.e. the portion of current income set aside rather than consumed).  Finally, similar to 
current debates within the accounting profession, economists at the BEA are concerned 
with how to measure and present the value of assets in the absence of clearly defined 
market prices (e.g. owner-occupied housing). 
The National Income and Product Accounts consist of seven summary accounts 
supported by hundreds of detailed tables (BEA 2008).  A brief description of each 
summary account is as follows.  Account 1 (Domestic Income and Product Account) 
aggregates the underlying production accounts for domestic sectors of the U.S. economy. 
Aggregate corporate profits and GDP data used in the empirical tests are prominent 
elements of Account 1 which presents the total final output produced in the nation and 
the incomes generated as a result of its production.  Account 2 (Private Enterprise 
Income Account) provides additional information on the sources and uses of the income 
of private businesses.  Account 3 (Personal Income and Outlay Account) shows the 
sources and uses of income received by persons (e.g. individuals and private trust funds).  
Account 4 (Government Receipts and Expenditures Account) summarizes transactions of 
federal, state, and local governments.  Account 5 (Foreign Transactions Current 
Account) presents information on receipts and payments associated with foreign trade and 
other transactions not involving transfers of assets.  Account 6 (Domestic Capital 
Account) presents information on national saving and investment.  Account 7 (Foreign 
Transactions Capital Account) presents information on capital transactions with 
foreigners that are linked to the acquisition or disposition of assets.  
National Income and Product Summary Accounts 1, 2, and 3 combine to present 
nationwide information loosely analogous to an income statement and statement of 
retained earnings for a firm under GAAP.  Account 6 is loosely analogous to a national 
42
statement of cash flows (BEA 2007a).  Accounts 4, 5, and 7 deal with government and 
foreign transactions, and thus these accounts don’t have a corresponding statement within 
GAAP.  The National Income and Product Accounts are mainly flow-based, and the BEA 
does not construct direct stock-based analogs to a GAAP balance sheet.   
5.2 Aggregate Corporate Profits 
Within the National Income and Product Accounts, aggregate corporate profits 
represent the pre-tax sum of profits from current production earned by all entities 
required to file a federal tax return (BEA 2002).  The BEA uses both publicly available 
external financial reporting data and proprietary income tax return data from the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) when compiling aggregate corporate profits.  The BEA uses both 
data sources because neither source is individually sufficient to produce a timely 
summary measure of profits for all firms (BEA 2002, Himmelberg et al. 2004).   
The advantage of using proprietary IRS data is that it covers both public and 
private firms (BEA 2002).  Specifically, totals are tabulated for all active corporations 
with more than $50 million of assets and for stratified samples of smaller firms included 
within the population covered by the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income 
calculations.  However, the disadvantage of using tax return data is that tax returns are 
only available annually with a lag.  In contrast, GAAP data are available for only a subset 
of firms, but the data are available on a quarterly basis.  Furthermore, there are additional 
tradeoffs associated with each underlying data source.  For example, external financial 
reporting data are generally audited while IRS data is not, but firms have less flexibility 
in reporting income for tax purposes which increases uniformity across firms (BEA 
2004).   
The specific mix of GAAP and tax data used for a firm depends on the firm’s 
principal business activity.  Firms declare their principal business activity on their tax 
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return, and the principal business activity codes used by the IRS are similar in format and 
structure to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes (BEA 2002).  GAAP and 
related financial data forms the basis of the BEA’s estimate of corporate profits for firms 
in the following industries: services, trucking, warehousing, communication, gas and 
electric utilities, security and commodity brokers, life insurance carriers, real estate, 
credit agencies, agriculture, construction, transportation, insurance, and pipelines.  IRS 
data forms the basis of the BEA’s estimate of corporate profits for firms in the mining, 
manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade industries.  Finally, income tabulated from 
reports filed with regulatory agencies form the basis of the BEA’s estimate of corporate 
profits for railroads, airlines, and banks.  See the 2002 BEA publication entitled 
Corporate Profits: Profits Before Tax, Profits Tax Liability, and Dividends Methodology 
Paper for further discussion of the source data underlying the BEA’s measure of 
aggregate corporate profits.   
The BEA makes a variety of adjustments to the underlying source data.  These 
adjustments are meant to generate an accrual accounting based estimate of aggregate 
corporate profits that is consistent with the BEA’s notion of economic income, free from 
changes in GAAP and tax laws, and consistent across time (BEA 2004, BEA 2007a, 
Landefeld et al. 2008).  Two of the most significant adjustments are the inventory 
valuation and capital consumption adjustments.  The inventory valuation adjustment 
restates cost-of-goods sold expense as if inventories were valued at current cost.  The 
capital consumption adjustment bases asset service lives on uniform and empirically 
based estimates and restates depreciation expense to a current-cost basis.  The resulting 
depreciation expense is meant to approximate the amount that would need to be saved to 
replace fixed assets as they are used up during production.   
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See Appendix A for a more complete description of the differences in accounting 
methods between Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, the Internal Revenue Code, 
and the National Income and Product Accounts.  The majority of the differences appear 
to bias against finding conditional conservatism at the aggregate level.  For example, 
conditionally conservative lower of cost or market inventory writedowns are removed 
from BEA estimates of aggregate corporate profits. 
In order to balance providing timely yet accurate estimates, the BEA uses a 
release cycle for most NIPA estimates including aggregate corporate profits (BEA 2008).  
The first estimate of aggregate corporate profits for calendar year t is generally released 
in July of year t+1.  This “first July estimate” is largely based on GAAP financial 
statements and U.S. Census Bureau data.  The release for year t also includes revisions to 
estimates for year t-1 (the “second July estimate”) which incorporates preliminary IRS 
data.  Finally, the release for year t includes revisions to estimates for year t-2 (the “third 
July estimate”) which incorporates the final IRS data.  The time-series of aggregate 
corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments measured 
in nominal year t dollars used in the empirical tests is obtained from Line 17 of NIPA 
Table 1.7.5.   
5.3 Gross Domestic Product 
Aggregate corporate profits are a significant component of gross domestic 
product, i.e. the market value of the final goods and services produced by labor and 
property in the United States (BEA 2008).  GDP is the BEA’s primary summary measure 
of economic activity, but GDP is not a measure of economic well-being (BEA 2007b).  In 
other words, GDP does not consider social welfare issues such as rates of crime, poverty, 
or literacy.   
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The BEA measures GDP in three distinct ways; see Figure 1 for a graphical 
depiction of the alternative measurement methodologies.  First, the BEA uses an 
“expenditures approach” to measure the value of goods and services sold to final users.  
This approach sums personal consumption expenditures (i.e. the value of the goods and 
services purchased by individuals), gross private fixed investment (i.e. additions and 
replacements to the stock of private fixed assets excluding depreciation), changes in 
private inventories (i.e. the change in the physical volume of inventories owned by 
private businesses), net exports of goods and services (i.e. the value of exports less 
imports), and government consumption expenditures and gross investment (i.e. spending 
and investment by governments in order to produce and provide goods and services to the 
public).  See Appendix B for an illustration of the expenditures approach for measuring 
GDP using the 2006 values for National Income and Product Account Table 1.1.5.   
Second, the BEA measures the income derived from the sale of final goods and 
services.  This “income approach” includes employee compensation (i.e. wages, salaries, 
and employer contributions for employee pensions, insurance, and government social 
insurance), taxes on production and imports (i.e. federal excise taxes and state and local 
sales taxes), net operating surplus (i.e. aggregate corporate profits plus current 
government surpluses or deficits), and the consumption of fixed capital (i.e. economic 
depreciation) less subsidies (i.e. monetary grants by government agencies to private 
business).  See Appendix C for an illustration of the income approach using the 2006 
values for National Income and Product Account Table 1.10.   
Third, the BEA sums the value added at each stage of production.  This 
“production approach” defines gross value added as the country’s gross output less the 
value of intermediate goods.  Gross value added is calculated by first finding the 
difference between each industry’s total output and its intermediate purchases from other 
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industries.  Intermediate purchases and sales are eliminated once value added is 
aggregated across all industries.  The remainder is industry sales to final users, or gross 
value added.   
The three measurement approaches are theoretically equivalent.  For illustration 
purposes, consider a simple one-period economy with three individuals.  Robert is 
endowed with some amount of lumber, Ross is endowed with tools and $100 of currency, 
and Bill is endowed with $200 of currency.  During the period, Robert sells all of his 
lumber to Ross for $100.  In turn, Ross uses his tools, the acquired lumber, and his own 
labor to manufacture a desk.  Finally, Ross sells the desk to Bill for $200.  Under the 
expenditures approach, the GDP for this simple economy would be equal to $200 (i.e. the 
market value of the desk).  The lumber in this example is an intermediate good, and thus 
the value of the lumber is included in the market value of the final desk.  Under the 
income approach, Robert earned $100 on the sale of the raw lumber and Ross earned 
$100 of profit upon the sale of the finished desk for a total gross domestic income of 
$200.  Thus, the gross domestic income for the economy was equal to the gross domestic 
product.   
In practice, estimates of gross domestic product, gross domestic income, and 
gross value added vary slightly due to differences in estimation techniques and 
underlying source data (BEA 2007a, 2008).  The univariate Pearson and Spearman 
correlations between gross domestic product and gross domestic income exceed 0.99 in 
my sample.  The results of all empirical tests utilizing gross domestic product estimates 
are quantitatively and qualitatively similar when using gross domestic income. 
The BEA uses a variety of data to construct GDP estimates including survey data 
from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Office of Management 
and Budget, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Agriculture.  
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Additionally, the BEA utilizes information from state and local governments (e.g. data on 
regulated public utilities and building permits) as well as data from trade associations, 
businesses, international organizations, and BEA surveys on international direct 
investment when compiling estimates for the National Income and Product Accounts.  
For a full description of all gross domestic product source data, see BEA (2008) and 
Landefeld et al. (2008).   
For annual GDP estimates, the first estimate for calendar year t is published in the 
summer of year t+1.  Each annual GDP release also revises previous estimates for year t-
1 and t-2.  These annual revisions incorporate recently available and revised annual 
source data including Census Bureau surveys, IRS tabulations of income tax returns, and 
tabulations of employment and wages from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The BEA also 
does a comprehensive revision of each annual GDP estimate after 5 years to incorporate 
the most accurate census data available (BEA 2007b).  Annual estimates of GDP 
measured in nominal year t dollars are obtained from Line 1 of NIPA Table 1.7.5. 
5.4 Adjustments for Price Level Changes 
The annual estimates of aggregate corporate profits and gross domestic product 
described above are measured in current year t dollars.  In other words, all estimates 
reflect aggregated transactions in terms of their value in the periods in which they take 
place.  As a result, changes over time in the current-dollar measures can reflect a change 
in quantity, a change in price, or a combination of both.  In order to separate these effects, 
the BEA derives annual changes in quantities and prices using a Fisher formula with 
weights from adjacent years.  These annual changes are “chained” (i.e. multiplied) 
together to form time series of quantity and price indices.  The chained approach is 
computationally difficult, and the level of an index in any single period is not in itself 
meaningful.  However, the relation of an index level to an index level in another period 
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can be used to create inflation-adjusted aggregate measures (BEA 2008, Landefeld et al. 
2008). 
Current dollar estimates (instead of real measures) are used within the empirical 
tests for multiple reasons.  First, the BEA does not provide real (i.e. price-adjusted) 
estimates of aggregate corporate profits (BEA 2002).  Thus, creating an inflation adjusted 
measure of aggregate corporate profits would require the use of a proper price scalar, 
which is difficult because price indices generally cannot be associated with income 
measures in the same fashion as product measures (BEA 2002).  Moreover, a 
fundamental problem when adjusting aggregate estimates for inflation is that there is not 
a single inflation measure.  Instead, prices for a wide spectrum of goods and services are 
changing relative to one another over time (BEA 2008). Therefore, the method of 
aggregating prices for individual components can significantly impact the resulting 
composite index. 
Furthermore, there is some debate as to the optimal measure of inflation.  One 
commonly used measure of inflation in the U.S. economy is the percent change in the 
price index for gross domestic purchases, which measures the prices of goods and 
services purchased by U.S. residents across the world.  In contrast, the price index for 
gross domestic product measures the prices of goods and services produced in the United 
States.  Other prominent aggregate inflation measures produced by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics include the Consumer Price Index, the Producer Price Index, the Personal 
Consumption Expenditures Price Index, and various international price indices.  
Moreover, variants of the above price indices known as “core inflation” measures 
exclude volatile food and energy prices.   
Finally, price-adjusted output measures produced by the BEA (e.g. real gross 
domestic product) may continue to exhibit non-stationarity.  For example, gross domestic 
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product has historically increased over time due to technological progress and gains in 
efficiency even after controlling for inflation.  Therefore, even using real measures of 
output could require additional econometric remedies for non-stationarity.   
Due to the problems with price-adjusted aggregate data described above, 
aggregate corporate profits and GDP estimates are instead scaled by nominal aggregate 
fixed assets when used as a dependent variable within a regression in order to eliminate 
the impact of inflation and generate stationary variables.  Estimates of the net fixed assets 
owned by public and private businesses (plus non-profit institutions and governments) 
are obtained from Line 3 (Line 2) of BEA Fixed Asset Table 1.1.  These estimates, 
measured in billions of nominal year t dollars, are constructed from U.S. Census Bureau 
survey data and approximate the current-cost value of net fixed assets used in production 
for more than one year (BEA 2003). 
5.5 Other Data 
All other data used in this study are also publicly available.  Monthly risk free 
rates, monthly price levels for the S&P 500 index, and return data are obtained from 
Wharton Research Data Services.  Federal funds rate data and monthly yields on AAA 
and BAA corporate bonds are from Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15 available at 
www.federalreserve.gov.  Monthly S&P 500 earnings data are available on Professor 
Robert Shiller’s website at www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.  Book-to-market ratio 
and return data for six portfolios formed on size and book-to-market are available on 
Professor Kenneth French’s website at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.  Estimates of 
potential GDP measured in year 2000 dollars are obtained from the Congressional Budget 
Office at www.cbo.gov.  Implicit GDP deflator data used to construct proxies for 
inflation are obtained from Line 1 of BEA NIPA Table 1.1.9.   
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Aggregate taxable income data are obtained from Column 3 of Internal Revenue 
Service Statistics of Income (SOI) Table 15 at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/.  Industrial 
production and University of Michigan consumer sentiment data are obtained from the 
Federal Reserve Economic (“FRED”) database at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.  
Data on residential housing starts are obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau at 
http://www.census.gov/.   Unemployment data is obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics at http://bls.gov/data/.  Finally, start and end dates for recessions are obtained 
from the National Bureau of Economic Research at http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. 
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Chapter 6:  Results – Accounting Conservatism and Macroeconomic 
Indicators 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and parameter estimates for the vector 
autoregression system used to construct proxies for news about aggregate corporate 
sector fundamentals.  Parameter estimates within the first row of Panel B suggest that 
three of the four macroeconomic state variables contain predictive power for future 
aggregate excess returns.  First, the positive and significant coefficient on XRETt-1 of 
0.122 is consistent with momentum within aggregate returns.  Second, the positive 
coefficient on DEFt-1 of 0.528 is consistent with prior studies that find a positive 
correlation between the default spread and future aggregate returns (Fama and French 
1989).  Third, the negative and significant coefficient on PEt-1 of -0.012 is consistent with 
prior research demonstrating that larger aggregate price-to-earnings ratios predict lower 
future aggregate returns (Campbell and Vuolteenaho 2004).  Finally, the adjusted R2 of 
3% for the aggregate return equation and the remaining VAR results are all generally 
consistent with prior research (see Campbell and Vuolteenaho 2004).   
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the aggregate-level variables used to 
identify conditional conservatism within select macroeconomic indicators.  Aggregate 
corporate profits, gross domestic product, and aggregate fixed assets are measured in 
billions of nominal year t dollars.  Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics for these 
unscaled variables indicate failure to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, consistent 
with a time trend due to inflation.  The mean and median values for the unscaled 
variables are not particularly informative given the time trend.  However, the raw values 
demonstrate the economic magnitude of the quantities involved.  For example, aggregate 
corporate profits compiled by the BEA totaled $1.6 Trillion in 2007, and GDP for the 
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year totaled $13.8 Trillion.  For perspective, the summation of GAAP earnings for all 
firms on Compustat in 2007 totaled approximately $688 Billion.   
In order to eliminate the impact of inflation and generate stationary variables, 
aggregate corporate profits and GDP estimates are scaled by aggregate fixed assets when 
used as a dependent variable within a regression.  Within Table 1, augmented Dickey-
Fuller test statistics for each of the scaled variables suggest rejection of the null 
hypothesis of a unit root in favor of the alternative hypothesis of a stationary time-series.  
The mean and median value for scaled aggregate corporate profits of 0.05 suggests that 
aggregate return on fixed assets for the entire corporate sector is approximately 5%.  
Similarly, the mean and median value for scaled GDP of 0.37 indicates that the U.S. 
economy produces goods and services with a final market value of $0.37 for each dollar 
of assets owned by businesses, non-profit institutions, and governments.   
Table 2 also shows that the mean value for the CFNews (CFNeg) variable is 0.00 
(0.46).  These first moment statistics are consistent with my proxy for aggregate cash 
flow news approximating a uniformly distributed random variable with mean zero, as 
desired.  Moreover, the mean CFNeg value of 0.46 indicates that the 46% of sample years 
characterized as “bad news” observations are not limited to recessions or anomalies like 
the Great Depression.   Finally, augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics show that the 
aggregate news variables are stable over time.   
Table 3 presents the results of the aggregate-level time-series regressions 
designed to determine whether aggregate corporate profits and GDP estimates exhibit 
conditional conservatism.  Based on firm-level conservatism studies (e.g. Basu 1997), 
one may expect a positive coefficient on the main effect news variable (CFNews).  
However, the θ1 coefficients in both Models (6) and (7) are indistinguishable from zero.  
Two possible explanations for the discrepancy between the firm-level and the aggregate-
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level results for the main effect variable are as follows.  First, recent firm-level 
conservatism studies (e.g. LaFond and Watts 2008) generate a positive and significant 
main effect coefficient by estimating Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions by year.  
However, such cross-sectional econometric treatments are not possible with the pure 
time-series data in my study.  Second, firm-level conservatism studies typically utilize 
large panel data sets with thousands of firm-year observations.  In contrast, my study has 
only 79 observations for one macroeconomic unit (i.e. the U.S. economy).  Such short 
time series are typical within the empirical macroeconomics literature, and I likely have 
less statistical power compared to firm-level studies within the accounting literature.   
Turning to the variables of interest, the θ3 coefficient on the CFNewst*CFNegt 
interaction term of 0.100 within Model (6) is significantly positive.  This result suggests 
that aggregate corporate profits are more sensitive to negative aggregate cash flow news 
than to positive aggregate cash flow news.  Similarly, the significantly positive θ3 
coefficient of 0.211 within Model (7) suggests that GDP estimates are more sensitive to 
negative aggregate cash flow news than to positive aggregate cash flow news.  This 
asymmetric response of aggregate corporate profits and GDP to negative aggregate cash 
flow news as compared to positive aggregate cash flow news is consistent with firm-level 
accounting conservatism aggregating to influence the measurement attributes of key 
macroeconomic indicators.  Moreover, these results suggest that the behavior of 
macroeconomic signals based, in part, on financial reporting data resembles the 
conditionally conservative behavior of a representative firm’s earnings, despite a lack of 
central authority or coordination between firms. 
I perform multiple robustness checks in an attempt to show that the conservatism 
within aggregate corporate profits and GDP is a function of the conservatism within firm-
level GAAP earnings.  First, I replicate Model (6) using aggregate GAAP-based 
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Compustat earnings as the dependent variable.  Panel A of Table 4 shows that the θ1 
coefficient is positive and significant, but the θ3 coefficient of interest is not statistically 
different from zero.  The insignificant θ3 coefficient indicates a failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of no conditional conservatism within aggregate Compustat earnings.   
However, aggregated Compustat earnings are only available beginning in 1962, 
whereas BEA data is available back to 1929.  Hence, the Compustat sample consists of 
only 46 observations, which is 42% smaller than the BEA sample.  In order to investigate 
a lack of power as an explanation for the insignificant interaction coefficient in Panel A, I 
re-estimate Model (6) using BEA data over the Compustat sample period.  The results 
presented in Panel B of Table 4 show an insignificant θ3 coefficient for the BEA data in 
the reduced sample.  Because the θ3 coefficient for the BEA data is positive and 
significant in the unrestricted sample in Table 3, the failure to identify conditional 
conservatism within aggregate Compustat earnings may be attributed to Compustat’s 
limited sample period. 
Second, I attempt to rule out the BEA’s use of aggregated tax data as the source 
of the conservatism within aggregate corporate profits and GDP.  Accordingly, I replicate 
Model (6) using aggregate taxable income as tabulated in the Internal Revenue Service’s 
Statistics of Income tables as the dependent variable.  The lack of a significant interaction 
coefficient in Table 5 indicates failure to reject the null hypothesis of no conditional 
conservatism within aggregate IRS taxable income.  This result is consistent with the 
conservatism within aggregate corporate profits and GDP being a function of the 
conservatism within firm-level GAAP earnings rather than a function of the BEA’s use of 
tax source data.  However, aggregated IRS data is only available back to 1960, and thus I 
cannot rule out insufficient power as an explanation for the lack of a significant 
interaction coefficient in Table 5.   
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In summary, the results in this section show that aggregate corporate profits and 
GDP are more sensitive to negative aggregate cash flow news than to positive aggregate 
cash flow news.  This asymmetric sensitivity is consistent with firm-level accounting 
conservatism aggregating to influence the measurement attributes of key macroeconomic 
indicators.  However, data limitations prevent me from definitively isolating the 
asymmetric timeliness within firm-level GAAP earnings as the source of the asymmetric 
timeliness within aggregate corporate profits and GDP.  Thus, my results are subject to 
the caveat that the asymmetric timeliness identified within the macroeconomic indicators 
may arise from an alternative source (e.g. the inclusion of both public and private firms in 
the population, differences in accounting methods between GAAP and the national 
economic accounts, or the BEA’s use of both GAAP and IRS source data).  However, all 
subsequent estimates of the dollar value impact of firm-level conservatism on 
measurements of macroeconomic fundamentals and the results from the associated 
monetary policy tests are robust and based on established measures of accounting 
conservatism utilizing firm-level GAAP data (e.g. Basu 1997). 
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Chapter 7:  Results – Accounting Conservatism and Monetary Policy 
The remaining results provide evidence as to whether accounting conservatism’s 
influence on macroeconomic indicators affects federal funds rate decisions made by the 
U.S. Federal Reserve.  As described above, I quantify accounting conservatism’s dollar 
value impact on aggregate corporate profits by first estimating annual cross-sectional 
specifications of Model (10).  Figure 2 plots the resulting annual α3 coefficients which 
can be interpreted as the degree to which the cross-section of firm-level earnings 
responds more to bad news than to good news.  The plot shows that the degree of 
accounting conservatism within firm-level earnings exhibits significant time-series 
variation, and the general upward trend is consistent with research which finds that 
accounting conservatism has increased over time (Givoly and Hayn 2000, Beaver and 
Ryan 2009).   
Table 6 presents the results of regression Model (11) which examines how the 
time-series of aggregate corporate profits reacts to the degree of conditional conservatism 
within the cross-section of firm-level earnings.  The negative and significant Φ3 
coefficient of -0.023 on the FirmConst variable (i.e. the α3 coefficient plotted in Figure 2) 
suggests that scaled aggregate corporate profits are lower when firm-level earnings are 
more conservative.  Similarly, the negative and significant Φ4 coefficient of -0.008 on the 
NBER variable suggests that scaled aggregate corporate profits are lower during 
recessions.  Keeping the fitted value from Model (11) where FirmConst is restricted to 
zero and multiplying by aggregate fixed assets generates an estimate of aggregate 
corporate profits as if firm-level earnings were not conditionally conservative (CPt*).  
Subtracting observed aggregate corporate profits from CPt* yields an estimate of the year 
t dollar value impact of firm-level accounting conservatism on estimates of aggregate 
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corporate profits and GDP (CONSt).  Figure 2 shows that the significant time-series 
variation in CONS closely mimics the time-series variation in the degree of conservatism 
within firm-level earnings.  This suggests that CONS is not merely noise or estimation 
error.  Moreover, the upward trend in CONS is consistent with an increase in accounting 
conservatism over time (Givoly and Hayn 2000, Beaver and Ryan 2009).   
I also perform validity checks on my proxy for the dollar value impact of firm-
level accounting conservatism on aggregate corporate profits and GDP.  First, I explore 
whether the degree of conservatism within the cross-section of firm-level earnings varies 
according to the business cycle.  Table 7 presents the results from re-estimating 
regression Model (10) with the addition of dummy variables and interaction terms for 
whether the firm-year observation occurred before, during, or after a recession.  The 
positive and significant α3 coefficient on the PreNBER dummy variable suggests that 
firm-level earnings tend to be higher in the year before recessions.  More importantly, the 
positive and significant α7 and α8 coefficients suggest that firms tend to report more 
conservatively both before and during recessions.  Moreover, the negative and significant 
α9 coefficient suggests that firms report less conservatively after recessions.  These 
results are notable for two reasons.  First, movement through the business cycle may 
drive systematic changes in firms’ conservatism outcomes (i.e. the business cycle may act 
as a coordination mechanism).  Second, the results in Table 7 may raise the concern that 
CONS is simply a proxy for the business cycle rather than a proxy for the dollar value 
impact of firm-level conservatism on macroeconomic indicators.   
In order to further investigate the impact of the business cycle on the CONS 
variable, I estimate univariate correlations between CONS and select macroeconomic 
indicators.  The results in Table 8 show that CONS is not significantly correlated with the 
return on the CRSP value-weighted index (EQUITY), the number of new residential 
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housing starts as measured by the U.S. Census Bureau (HOUSING), the University of 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment index (CONSUMER), the unemployment rate of the 
civilian non-institutional population as measured by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
or recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).  Table 8 
shows that CONS is significantly negatively correlated with the percentage change in the 
Federal Reserve’s Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization index (INDPRO).  
However, industrial production is an output based indicator that is highly correlated with 
GDP.  Therefore, a negative correlation between CONS and INDPRO is not surprising 
given the results in Table 6 which show that aggregate corporate profits (and thus GDP) 
are negatively correlated with the degree of conditional conservatism within firm-level 
earnings.11
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used within the monetary 
policy reaction functions designed to determine whether accounting conservatism’s dollar 
value impact on measurements of macroeconomic fundamentals affects federal funds rate 
decisions.  The mean FEDFUNDS value of 5.735 indicates the federal funds rate set by 
the Fed averages 5.7% over the sample period.  The mean GAP1 value of 1.544 suggests 
that real economic output averages approximately $1.5 Billion less than the level of 
output that could be obtained if the economy was operating at its highest sustainable 
level.  This small average output gap suggests that the Federal Reserve is fairly adept in 
promoting output and employment, which is one half of the Fed’s mandate.  However, 
maintaining a small output gap has a cost in the form of a mean annual inflation rate 
  Overall, the results in Table 8 suggest that CONS is free from omitted 
correlated variable bias arising from the business cycle.  Taken together, the results in 
Figure 2 and Table 8 suggest that my estimates of the dollar value impact of firm-level 
accounting conservatism on aggregate corporate profits and GDP are reasonable. 
11 The results of all subsequent monetary policy tests are robust to the inclusion of controls for industrial 
production (results untabulated).   
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(INF) of 3.1%.  The mean CONS value of 114.412 suggests that GDP would have 
averaged approximately $114 Billion higher in the absence of accounting conservatism.  
As a result, the mean output gap adjusted for the impact of accounting conservatism 
(GAP2) of -109.518 suggests that real economic output exceeds the sustainable output 
level by an average of $109.5 Billion (i.e. the economy appears “overheated”).  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests statistics suggest that the FEDFUNDS, GAP1, GAP2, and 
INF variables are all stationary.  The null hypothesis of a unit root for CONS cannot be 
rejected, which is consistent with an increase in the dollar value impact of accounting 
conservatism on GDP measurements as the economy grows over time.   
Table 10 presents parameter estimates for the monetary policy reaction functions.  
Model (13a) represents a baseline reaction function following prior research.  The 
negative and significant β1 coefficient on GAP1 of -0.007 suggests that the Federal Open 
Market Committee sets the federal funds rate 0.7 basis points lower for every $1 Billion 
of output gap (i.e. the FOMC maintains lower interest rates when the economy has “room 
to grow”).  In contrast, the positive and significant β2 coefficient on INF of 1.003 
suggests the FOMC sets the federal funds rate 1.003% higher for every 1% of inflation.  
The positive and significant β3 (β4) coefficient on the VOLCKER (POSTVOLCKER) fixed 
effect variables of 5.357 (1.454) suggests the federal funds rate was approximately 5.4% 
(1.5%) higher during the Paul Volcker (Alan Greenspan or Ben Bernanke) chairmanship 
as compared to the pre-Volcker era, irrespective of the output gap and the inflation rate.  
The adjusted R2 of 78% suggests that the baseline reaction function can explain a 
significant portion of federal funds rate decisions.  Overall, these results are consistent 
with prior research (Taylor 1993, Kozicki 1999, Ball and Tchaidze 2002).   
Table 10 also presents the results of Model (13b) which modifies the baseline 
reaction function to incorporate accounting conservatism’s dollar value impact on GDP 
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measurements.  The coefficients on INF and the adjusted output gap (GAP2) are 
consistent with the corresponding coefficients within the baseline reaction function.  With 
respect to the variable of interest, the negative and significant Ψ3 coefficient on CONS of 
-0.015 indicates that the federal funds rate tends to be lower when the dollar value impact 
of firm-level accounting conservatism on GDP measurements is larger.   
Macroeconomics research typically estimates monetary policy reaction functions 
like Models (13a) and (13b) in levels for two reasons.  First, theoretical models of the 
central banker’s task often generate testable predictions specified in levels.  Second, 
explanatory power is typically greater for reaction functions specified in levels.  
However, media outlets, investors, and decision makers may be more focused on changes 
in output, inflation, and the federal funds rate rather than on the levels themselves.  Thus, 
I re-estimate Models (13a) and (13b) using changes specifications.  Table 11 shows that 
all inferences from the levels analysis in Table 10 hold in the changes analysis.  Most 
notably, the negative and significant coefficient on ΔCONS of -0.012 in Panel B suggests 
that changes in the dollar value impact of firm-level conservatism on GDP are negatively 
associated with changes in the federal funds rate.   
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
This study investigates the macroeconomic consequences of firm-level accounting 
conservatism.  Consistent with conditional conservatism extending to the aggregate level, 
I demonstrate that annual estimates of aggregate corporate profits and gross domestic 
product from 1929 to 2007 compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis are more 
sensitive to negative aggregate cash flow news than to positive aggregate cash flow news.  
Next, I estimate the dollar value impact of firm-level accounting conservatism on 
measurements of macroeconomic fundamentals.  Finally, I show that the federal funds 
rate set by the U.S. Federal Reserve tends to be lower when the dollar value impact of 
firm-level accounting conservatism on gross domestic product measurements is larger.   
These results should be of interest to researchers and a variety of capital market 
participants.  First, my results suggest that accounting can affect social welfare by 
influencing the measurement of key macroeconomic indicators and shaping monetary 
policy decisions which regulate the money supply and alter macroeconomic growth.  
Second, understanding how firm-level accounting measurements interact with the 
national economic accounts is important because changes in accounting standards or 
practice (e.g. the increased use of fair value measurements and the proposed convergence 
between GAAP and IFRS) could alter the measurement of aggregate fundamentals and 
lead to unintended macroeconomic consequences.  Lastly, increased government 
regulation and intervention in global capital markets calls for research which examines 
how central planners, regulators, and other macroeconomic units use accounting 
measurements when making economic decisions outside of pure market settings. 
The results of this study are meant to be strictly positive, and I refrain from 
making normative statements.  For example, I make no normative statements regarding 
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the value of accounting conservatism for two reasons.  First, determining whether 
accounting conservatism’s impact on macroeconomic indicators and monetary policy 
decisions is socially desirable would require specifying an objective function for the 
whole of society which is naturally quite difficult.  Second, any single study is unlikely to 
be able to simultaneously weigh all of the firm-level and aggregate-level costs and 
benefits associated with accounting conservatism.   
Similarly, I make no judgments about the Federal Reserve’s response to the 
influence of firm-level accounting conservatism on macroeconomic indicators.  For 
example, one interpretation of my results is that the Fed is unable to fully unwind the 
impact of accounting conservatism on GDP (i.e. the Fed is functionally fixated).  Under 
this interpretation, firm-level accounting conservatism may impose a negative 
information externality on the Fed by introducing apparent weakness into measurements 
of macroeconomic fundamentals.  Hence, the Fed may sub-optimize by setting interest 
rates below the socially desirable level.  However, the Fed’s response may be rational and 
optimal given the cost and difficulty of unwinding the impact of accounting conservatism 
in practice.  For example, academic researchers form proxies for constructs like 
recessions and conservatism ex-post with the benefit of historical data while the Fed must 
make policy decisions under uncertainty in real time with incomplete data.   
Alternatively, the Fed may find it optimal not to adjust for the impact of firm-
level accounting conservatism.  For example, prior research at the firm level asserts that 
conservatism provides bondholders with advance notice of deterioration in firm 
performance, which allows bondholders to take control of the firm earlier in order to 
prevent further destruction of firm value by the manager (Watts 2003a).  In a similar 
fashion, accounting conservatism at the aggregate level may provide the Fed with 
advance warning of deterioration in macroeconomic activity.  Thus, accounting 
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conservatism may play an informational role at the aggregate level, and the costs and 
benefits of conservatism at the aggregate level may depend on the relative importance of 
the downside (i.e. recession) risk and upside (i.e. inflation) risk facing the central banker.   
Future research may investigate the welfare implications of my results.  For 
example, does conditional conservatism at the aggregate level lead to greater 
macroeconomic growth or inflation?  One example of current research that investigates 
related questions is Li and Shroff (2010) who investigate whether financial reporting 
quality leads to faster macroeconomic growth in an international setting.  Similarly, 
Bushman et al. (2010) investigate the relation between capital allocation decisions and 
the timely recognition of economic losses across countries.  See also Leuz and Wysocki 
(2008) for suggestions regarding future research on the macro effects of firms’ reporting 
and disclosure behavior.   
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Gross Domestic Product = Gross Domestic Income = Gross Value Added
This figure illustrates alternative ways the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) measures gross domestic product (GDP).  
This figure appears in the BEA publication "Concepts and Methods of the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts ", 
available at www.bea.gov.  Gross domestic product represents the market value of the final goods and services produced in 
the United States (BEA 2008).  
The BEA measures GDP in three ways.  First, the BEA uses an “expenditures approach” to arrive directly at a GDP estimate.  
Second, the BEA measures the income derived from the sale of final goods and services.  This “income approach” utilizes 
aggregate corporate profits as an input to net operating surplus and yields an estimate of gross domestic income (GDI).  
Third, the “production approach” subtracts the value of intermediate goods from gross output to arrive at an estimate of gross 
value added (GVA).  The three measurement approaches are theoretically equivalent, but estimates of GDP, GDI, and GVA 
may vary slightly due to differences in estimation techniques and underlying source data (BEA 2007a, 2008).
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The sample period begins in 1963, the first year in which all necessary data are available, and ends in 2007.  Vertical shaded 
bars denote years in which a recession occured as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.  
This figure plots measurements of accounting conservatism within the cross-section of firm-level earnings and estimates of the 
dollar value impact of firm-level accounting conservatism on measurements of macroeconomic fundamentals.  α3 is the year t 
Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness coefficient obtained from annual cross-sectional estimations of regression Model (10).
CONS t  is an estimate of the dollar value impact of firm-level accounting conservatism on aggregate corporate profits and 
gross domestic product (GDP) in year t .  CONS t  is the difference between an estimate of aggregate corporate profits in year t 
if firm-level earnings were not conditionally conservative (CP t
* ) and observed aggregate corporate profits in year t  (CP t ) 
from Line 17 of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National Income and Product Account (NIPA) Table 1.7.5.  CP t
*  is the 
fitted value from Model (11) where the FirmCons t  variable is restricted to zero, multiplied by aggregate fixed assets owned 
by public and private businesses in year t -1 from Line 3 of BEA Fixed Asset Table 1.1.  Values for CONS t are converted 
from nominal year t  dollars into real year 2000 dollars using the implicit GDP deflator from Line 1 of BEA NIPA Table 1.1.9.  
Larger positive values denote a greater dollar value impact of accounting conservatism on GDP (e.g. a CONS t value of 100 
















































Figure 2: The Impact of Firm-Level Accounting Conservatism on 





Deviation Q1 Median Q3
XRET 990 0.006 0.054 -0.022 0.009 0.036
DEF 990 0.011 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.013
PE 990 2.697 0.388 2.407 2.755 2.929
VALUE 990 1.632 0.362 1.400 1.506 1.719
Constant XRETt-1 DEFt-1 PEt-1 VALUEt-1 N R
2 F
XRETt 0.040 *** 0.122 *** 0.528 * -0.012 *** -0.005 989 0.03 6.61 ***
(2.93) (3.88) (1.68) (-2.65) (-0.81)
DEFt 0.000 -0.012 *** 0.970 *** 0.000 0.000 * 989 0.96 5,892.35 ***
(0.29) (-14.24) (116.59) (-0.45) (1.76)
PEt 0.024 0.032 1.896 *** 1.000 *** -0.026 *** 989 0.98 9,704.71 ***
(1.55) (0.91) (5.32) (191.95) (-3.74)
VALUEt 0.004 0.011 0.600 ** 0.007 0.982 *** 989 0.98 12,530.17 ***
(0.29) (0.38) (2.04) (1.61) (170.87)
Table 1
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Vector Autoregression Variables
The variables included in the VAR system are as follows.  XRET  denotes the excess of the monthly return on the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices value weighted index over the risk-free rate.  DEF  represents the default spread and is defined as 
the difference between the yield on a portfolio of seasoned BAA corporate bonds and the yield on seasoned AAA corporate 
bonds as measured by Moody’s.  PE  signifies the log of the 12-month trailing price-to-earnings ratio on the S&P 500 index.  
VALUE  denotes the small stock value spread defined as the difference between the logs of the book-to-market ratios of small 
high book-to-market stocks and small low book-to-market stocks.  
Panel B presents parameter estimates for the VAR system of the form z t = a  + Γz t-1 + u t where z t is an m x1 vector of 
macroeconomic state variables observable to the market by the end of period t , a  is an m x1 vector of constant parameters, Γ is 
the m xm  VAR companion matrix, and u t is an m x1 vector of independent and identically distributed residuals.  Each set of two 
rows corresponds to a single dependent variable within the VAR system.  The first row of each set presents parameter estimates, 
and the second row presents t -statistics in parentheses.  The columns present coefficient estimates for the independent variables 
as well as the number of observations, the R2, and the F -statistic.  ***, **, and * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel B: Vector Autoregression Parameter Estimates
This table presents descriptive statistics and parameter estimates for the first-order vector autoregression (VAR) system used to 
construct proxies for aggregate corporate sector news.  Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the monthly variables.  The 




Deviation Q1 Median Q3 2007 Value
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller
CP 79 278.82 389.53 29.10 93.20 426.60 1,642.40 2.17
GDP 79 3,003.63 3,810.45 267.30 910.00 5,103.80 13,807.50 4.71
FATotal 79 8,137.11 10,442.46 729.80 2,197.00 13,803.50 41,175.20 3.54
FAPrivate 79 6,325.81 8,237.89 515.40 1,608.50 10,710.80 32,429.30 3.66
CP / FAPrivate 79 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 -3.38 **
GDP / FATotal 79 0.37 0.04 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.34 -4.04 ***
CFNews 79 0.00 0.17 -0.10 0.03 0.10 -0.05 -7.01 ***
CFNeg 79 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 -6.24 ***
The augmented Dickey-Fuller τ statistic tests the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative hypothesis that 
the data series is stationary.  ***, **, and * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
Descriptive Statistics for Aggregate-Level Data
Table 2
This table presents descriptive statistics for select aggregate annual time-series data used within this study.  The 
sample period begins in 1929 and ends in 2007.  
CP  denotes aggregate corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments in year t  from 
Line 17 of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National Income and Product Account (NIPA) Table 1.7.5.  GDP 
represents estimates of gross domestic product in year t  from Line 1 of BEA NIPA Table 1.7.5.  FATotal  signifies the 
current-cost value of net fixed assets owned by public and private businesses, non-profit institutions, and governments 
in year t -1 from Line 2 of BEA Fixed Asset Table 1.1.  FAPrivate  is the current-cost value of net fixed assets owned 
by public and private businesses in year t -1 from Line 3 of BEA Fixed Asset Table 1.1.
CFNews  is the sum of monthly cash flow shocks in year t  formed from the first-order vector autoregression system 
presented in Table 1.  CFNeg  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if CFNews  < 0, and CFNeg  equals 0 otherwise.
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Models (6) and (7):
Dependent Variable = θ0 + θ1CFNewst + θ2CFNegt + θ3CFNewst*CFNegt + μt
Dependent variable: CPt / FAPrivatet-1 Dependent variable: GDPt / FATotalt-1
N 79 N 79
Adjusted R2 0.09 Adjusted R2 0.06
Variable Coefficient t -Statistic Variable Coefficient t -Statistic
Intercept 0.052 (10.98) *** Intercept 0.387 (33.71) ***
CFNews -0.047 (-1.50) CFNews -0.115 (-1.47)
CFNeg 0.000 (-0.05) CFNeg -0.009 (-0.65)
CFNews*CFNeg 0.100 (2.94) *** CFNews*CFNeg 0.211 (2.26) **
The sample period begins in 1929 and ends in 2007.  t -statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors to control 
for potential autocorrelation in the residuals.  ***, **, and * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
Sensitivity of Aggregate Corporate Profits and GDP to Aggregate Cash Flow News
Table 3
This table reports the results from separate time-series regressions of scaled aggregate corporate profits and gross domestic 
product on proxies for aggregate cash flow news.  
Model (6) Model (7)
CP t denotes aggregate corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments in year t  from Line 
17 of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National Income and Product Account (NIPA) Table 1.7.5.  GDP t represents 
gross domestic product in year t  from Line 1 of BEA NIPA Table 1.7.5.  FAPrivate t-1 is the current-cost value of net fixed 
assets owned by public and private businesses in year t -1 from Line 3 of BEA Fixed Asset Table 1.1.  FATotal t-1 is the 
current-cost value of net fixed assets owned by public and private businesses, non-profit institutions, and governments in 
year t -1 from Line 2 of BEA Fixed Asset Table 1.1.  CFNews t  is the sum of monthly cash flow shocks in year t  formed 
from the first-order vector autoregression system presented in Table 1.  CFNeg t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
CFNews t < 0, and CFNeg t equals 0 otherwise.  
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Dependent Variable = θ0 + θ1CFNewst + θ2CFNegt + θ3CFNewst*CFNegt + μt
Dependent variable: EARNt / FAPrivatet-1 Dependent variable: CPt / FAPrivatet-1
Sample period: 1962 - 2007 Sample period: 1962 - 2007
N 46 N 46
Adjusted R2 0.10 Adjusted R2 -0.01
Variable Coefficient t -Statistic Variable Coefficient t -Statistic
Intercept 0.011 (4.82) *** Intercept 0.046 (12.19) ***
CFNews 0.025 (3.91) *** CFNews 0.012 (0.54)
CFNeg 0.001 (1.11) CFNeg -0.002 (-0.47)
CFNews*CFNeg -0.018 (-1.35) CFNews*CFNeg -0.005 (-0.18)
t -statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors to control for potential autocorrelation in the residuals.  ***, **, 
and * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Table 4
Sensitivity of Aggregate Compustat Earnings to Aggregate Cash Flow News
Panel A Panel B
This table reports the results from separate time-series regressions of scaled aggregate Compustat earnings and aggregate 
BEA corporate profits on proxies for aggregate cash flow news.  
CP t denotes aggregate corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments in year t  from Line 
17 of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National Income and Product Account (NIPA) Table 1.7.5.  EARN t represents 
the sum of Compustat earnings (data item ib ) for all firms in year t .  FAPrivate t-1 is the current-cost value of net fixed assets 
owned by public and private businesses in year t -1 from Line 3 of BEA Fixed Asset Table 1.1.  CFNews t  is the sum of 
monthly cash flow shocks in year t  formed from the first-order vector autoregression system presented in Table 1.  CFNeg t 




Variable Coefficient t -Statistic




The sample period for begins in 1960 and ends in 2005.  t -statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors to control for 
potential autocorrelation in the residuals.  ***, **, and * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
IRSt / FAPrivatet-1 = θ0 + θ1CFNewst + θ2CFNegt + θ3CFNewst*CFNegt + μt
Table 5
Sensitivity of Aggregate IRS Taxable Income to Aggregate Cash Flow News
This table reports the results of a time-series regression of scaled aggregate IRS taxable income on proxies for aggregate cash flow 
news.  
IRS t represents aggregate taxable income in year t  from Column 3 of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics of Income (SOI) 
Table 15.  FAPrivate t-1 is the current-cost value of net fixed assets owned by public and private businesses in year t -1 from Line 3 
of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Fixed Asset Table 1.1.  CFNews t  is the sum of monthly cash flow shocks in year t  formed 
from the first-order vector autoregression system presented in Table 1.  CFNeg t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if CFNews t < 0, 
and CFNeg t equals 0 otherwise.  
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Model (11):
CPt / FAPrivatet-1 = Φ0 + Φ1NewsSenst + Φ2LossRecogt + Φ3FirmConst + Φ4NBERt + νt
N 45
Adjusted R2 0.29
Variable Coefficient t -Statistic
Intercept 0.055 (13.56) ***
NewsSens -0.018 (-0.79)
LossRecog 0.075 (1.29)
FirmCons -0.023 (-2.58) **
NBER -0.008 (-2.30) **
The sample period begins in 1963, the first year in which all necessary data are available, and ends in 2007.  t -statistics are 
based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors to control for potential autocorrelation in the residuals.  ***, **, and * 
represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Estimating the Impact of Firm-Level Conservatism on Aggregate Corporate Profits
Table 6
This table reports the results of a time-series regression designed to estimate the impact of firm-level accounting 
conservatism on scaled aggregate corporate profits.  
CP t denotes aggregate corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments in year t  from Line 
17 of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National Income and Product Account (NIPA) Table 1.7.5, and FAPrivate t-1 is 
the current-cost value of net fixed assets owned by public and private businesses in year t -1 from Line 3 of BEA Fixed 
Asset Table 1.1.  
NewsSens t , LossRecog t , and FirmCons t  are the year t  α1, α2, and α3 coefficients obtained from annual cross-sectional 
estimations of the Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness regression as defined by Model (10), respectively.  NBER t is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if a recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research occurred at any time 
during year t , and NBER t equals 0 otherwise.  
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     Xi,t / MVEi,t-1 = α0 + α1Ri,t + α2Negi,t + α3PreNBERt + α4NBERt + α5PostNBERt + α6Ri,t*Negi,t + α7Ri,t*Negi,t*PreNBERt + 
     α8Ri,t*Negi,t*NBERt + α9Ri,t*Negi,t *PostNBERt + μt
N 71,799
Adjusted R2 0.03
Variable Coefficient t -Statistic
Intercept 0.052 (7.80) ***
R -0.010 (-1.14)
Neg 0.002 (0.25)
PreNBER 0.032 (1.79) *
NBER 0.001 (0.02)
PostNBER 0.027 (1.51)
R*Neg 0.389 (13.22) ***
R*Neg*PreNBER 0.086 (2.61) ***
R*Neg*NBER 0.092 (2.08) **
R*Neg*PostNBER -0.093 (-2.05) **
PreNBER t  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research occurred at 
any time during year t -1, and PreNBER t  equals 0 otherwise.  NBER t  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a recession as defined by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research occurred at any time during year t , and NBER t  equals 0 otherwise.  PostNBER t  is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if a recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research occurred at any time during 
year t +1, and PostNBER t  equals 0 otherwise.
The sample period begins in 1963 and ends in 2007.  t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been clustered by both firm 
and year.  ***, **, and * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Table 7
The Relation Between the Business Cycle and Firm-Level Accounting Conservatism
This table reports the results from a cross-sectional regression of scaled firm-level earnings on proxies for firm-level news and the 
business cycle.  
X i, t denotes firm i ’s income before extraordinary items (Compustat item ib ) in fiscal year t , MVE i,t-1  denotes firm i ’s market value 
of equity defined as common shares outstanding (Compustat item csho ) multiplied by stock price (Compustat item prcc_f ) each as 
of the end of fiscal year t -1, R i,t  is firm i ’s buy-and-hold return in year t , Neg i,t  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if R i,t  < 0, and 
Neg i,t  equals 0 otherwise.  
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CONS EQUITY INDPRO HOUSING CONSUMER UNEMPLOY NBER
CONS 1.00 0.15 -0.31 ** -0.04 -0.02 0.15 0.02
EQUITY 0.15 1.00 0.09 -0.07 0.04 0.26 ** -0.18
INDPRO -0.39 *** -0.02 1.00 0.37 *** 0.54 *** -0.39 *** -0.50 ***
HOUSING 0.05 -0.07 0.34 ** 1.00 0.22 -0.13 -0.47 ***
CONSUMER -0.05 0.02 0.51 *** 0.19 1.00 -0.46 *** -0.55 ***
UNEMPLOY 0.18 0.26 ** -0.37 *** -0.07 -0.46 *** 1.00 0.09
NBER -0.04 -0.16 -0.51 *** -0.52 *** -0.54 *** 0.06 1.00
Table 8
Univariate Correlations
This table presents univariate correlations between select aggregate annual time-series variables. 
CONS  is an estimate of the dollar value impact of firm-level accounting conservatism on measurements of aggregate corporate profits and GDP 
in year t  defined by Equation (12) and described in Figure 2.  Values for CONS  are converted from nominal year t  dollars into real year 2000 
dollars using the implicit GDP deflator from Line 1 of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National Income and Product Account (NIPA) Table 
1.1.9.  Larger positive values denote a greater dollar value impact of accounting conservatism on GDP (e.g. a CONS  value of 100 indicates real 
GDP would have been approximately $100 Billion higher in the absence of accounting conservatism).
EQUITY  is the return on the Center for Research in Securities Prices value weighted index in year t .  INDPRO  is the percentage change from 
year t -1 to year t  in the Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization index as measured by the Federal Reserve.  HOUSING  is the number of 
new residential housing starts in year t  as measured by the U.S. Census Bureau.  CONSUMER  is the average of the monthly University of 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment index over year t .   
Pearson correlations are presented above the diagonal, and Spearman rank correlations are presented below the diagonal.  ***, **, and * represent 
two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
UNEMPLOY  is the unemployment rate of the civilian non-institutional population in year t  as measured by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
NBER  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research occurred at any time during year 




Deviation Q1 Median Q3 2007 Value
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller
FEDFUNDS 53 5.735 3.214 3.310 5.110 7.570 5.020 -2.85 *
GAP1 59 1.544 123.861 -63.606 12.293 62.608 96.557 -4.15 ***
GAP2 45 -109.518 139.547 -169.634 -124.054 -19.344 -156.774 -3.33 **
INF 78 3.066 3.713 1.547 2.837 5.001 2.864 -5.75 ***
CONS 45 114.412 85.295 48.524 104.965 154.849 253.331 -2.00
VOLCKER 79 0.101 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -2.45
POSTVOLCKER 79 0.253 0.438 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 -0.55
GAP2 t  is a measure of the output gap in year t  adjusted for the impact of accounting conservatism defined as GDPPotential t  - 
(GDP t  + CONS t ).  CONS t  is an estimate of the dollar value impact of firm-level accounting conservatism on measurements 
of aggregate corporate profits and GDP in year t  defined by Equation (12) and described in Figure 2.  Values for CONS  are 
converted from nominal year t  dollars into real year 2000 dollars using the implicit GDP deflator from Line 1 of BEA NIPA 
Table 1.1.9.  Larger positive values denote a greater dollar value impact of accounting conservatism on GDP (e.g. a CONS 
value of 100 indicates real GDP would have been approximately $100 Billion higher in the absence of accounting 
conservatism).  
INF t is a measure of inflation calculated as the percentage change in the implicit GDP deflator from Line 1 of BEA NIPA 
Table 1.1.9 from year t -1 to year t .  VOLCKER t (POSTVOLCKER t ) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Paul Volcker (Alan 
Greenspan or Ben Bernanke) was the Chairman of the Federal Reserve in year t , and VOLCKER t (POSTVOLCKER t ) equals 0 
otherwise.  
The augmented Dickey-Fuller τ statistic tests the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative hypothesis that the data 
series is stationary.  ***, **, and * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 9
This table reports descriptive statistics for variables within the monetary policy reaction functions designed to estimate 
accounting conservatism's impact on the federal funds rate.  FEDFUNDS t is the weighted average of the nominal federal 
funds rate in year t  obtained from the U.S. Federal Reserve's Statistical Release H.15.  GAP1 t is a measure of the output gap 
in year t  defined as GDPPotential t - GDP t where GDPPotential t is an estimate of potential GDP in year t  measured in real 
year 2000 dollars from the Congressional Budget Office.  GDP t is an estimate of GDP for year t  from Line 1 of Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) National Income and Product Account (NIPA) Table 1.7.5 which has been converted from nominal 
year t  dollars into real year 2000 dollars using the implicit GDP deflator from Line 1 of BEA NIPA Table 1.1.9.
Descriptive Statistics for Monetary Policy Reaction Function Variables
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Model (13a): FEDFUNDSt = β0 + β1GAP1t + β2INFt + β3VOLCKERt + β4POSTVOLCKERt + εt
Model (13b): FEDFUNDSt = Ψ0 + Ψ1GAP2t + Ψ2INFt + Ψ3CONSt + Ψ4VOLCKERt + Ψ5POSTVOLCKERt + ηt
Model (13a) Model (13b)
N 53 45











VOLCKER 5.357 *** 5.654 ***
(11.94) (10.66)
POSTVOLCKER 1.454 ** 2.704 ***
(2.10) (3.55)
GAP2 t  is a measure of the output gap in year t  adjusted for the impact of accounting conservatism defined as GDPPotential t  - 
(GDP t  + CONS t ).  CONS t  is an estimate of the dollar value impact of firm-level accounting conservatism on measurements 
of aggregate corporate profits and GDP in year t  defined by Equation (12) and described in Figure 2.  Values for CONS  are 
converted from nominal year t  dollars into real year 2000 dollars using the implicit GDP deflator from Line 1 of BEA NIPA 
Table 1.1.9.  Larger positive values denote a greater dollar value impact of accounting conservatism on GDP (e.g. a CONS 
value of 100 indicates real GDP would have been approximately $100 Billion higher in the absence of accounting 
conservatism).  
INF t is a measure of inflation calculated as the percentage change in the implicit GDP deflator from Line 1 of BEA NIPA 
Table 1.1.9 from year t -1 to year t .  VOLCKER t (POSTVOLCKER t ) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Paul Volcker (Alan 
Greenspan or Ben Bernanke) was the Chairman of the Federal Reserve in year t , and VOLCKER t (POSTVOLCKER t ) equals 0 
otherwise.  
The sample period for Model (13a) begins in 1955 and ends in 2007.  Estimating CONS t requires Compustat data, and 
therefore the sample period for Model (13b) begins in 1963 and ends in 2007.   t -statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors to control for potential autocorrelation in the residuals.  ***, **, and * represent two-tailed significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 10
This table reports the results from monetary policy reaction functions designed to estimate accounting conservatism's impact 
on the federal funds rate.  FEDFUNDS t is the weighted average of the nominal federal funds rate in year t  obtained from the 
U.S. Federal Reserve's Statistical Release H.15.  GAP1 t is a measure of the output gap in year t  defined as GDPPotential t - 
GDP t where GDPPotential t is an estimate of potential GDP in year t  measured in real year 2000 dollars from the 
Congressional Budget Office.  GDP t is an estimate of GDP for year t  from Line 1 of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
National Income and Product Account (NIPA) Table 1.7.5 which has been converted from nominal year t  dollars into real year 
2000 dollars using the implicit GDP deflator from Line 1 of BEA NIPA Table 1.1.9.
Monetary Policy Reaction Functions (Levels Analysis)
76
Panel A: ΔFEDFUNDSt = β0 + β1ΔGAP1t + β2ΔINFt + β3ΔVOLCKERt + β4ΔPOSTVOLCKERt + εt
Panel B: ΔFEDFUNDSt = Ψ0 + Ψ1ΔGAP2t + Ψ2ΔINFt + Ψ3ΔCONSt + Ψ4ΔVOLCKERt + Ψ5ΔPOSTVOLCKERt + ηt
Panel A Panel B
N 52 44
















Monetary Policy Reaction Functions (Changes Analysis)
This table reports the results from monetary policy reaction functions designed to estimate accounting conservatism's impact on 
the federal funds rate.  ΔFEDFUNDS t = FEDFUNDS t  - FEDFUNDS t-1  where FEDFUNDS t  is the weighted average of the 
nominal federal funds rate in year t  obtained from the U.S. Federal Reserve's Statistical Release H.15.  ΔGAP1 t = GAP1 t  - 
GAP1 t-1  where GAP1 t  is a measure of the output gap in year t  defined as GDPPotential t - GDP t.  GDPPotential t is an estimate 
of potential GDP in year t  measured in real year 2000 dollars from the Congressional Budget Office.  GDP t is an estimate of 
GDP for year t  from Line 1 of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National Income and Product Account (NIPA) Table 1.7.5 
which has been converted from nominal year t  dollars into real year 2000 dollars using the implicit GDP deflator from Line 1 of 
BEA NIPA Table 1.1.9.
ΔGAP2 t  = GAP2 t  - GAP2 t-1  where GAP2 t  is a measure of the output gap in year t  adjusted for the impact of accounting 
conservatism.  GAP2 t  is defined as GDPPotential t  - (GDP t  + CONS t ).  CONS t  is an estimate of the dollar value impact of 
firm-level accounting conservatism on measurements of aggregate corporate profits and GDP in year t  defined by Equation (12) 
and described in Figure 2.  Values for CONS  are converted from nominal year t  dollars into real year 2000 dollars using the 
implicit GDP deflator from Line 1 of BEA NIPA Table 1.1.9.  Larger positive values denote a greater dollar value impact of 
accounting conservatism on GDP (e.g. a CONS  value of 100 indicates real GDP would have been approximately $100 Billion 
higher in the absence of accounting conservatism).  ΔCONS t  = CONS t  - CONS t-1 .  
ΔINF t = INF t  - INF t-1 .  INF t  is a measure of inflation calculated as the percentage change in the implicit GDP deflator from 
Line 1 of BEA NIPA Table 1.1.9 from year t -1 to year t .  ΔVOLCKER t (ΔPOSTVOLCKER t ) is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if Paul Volcker (Alan Greenspan) became Chairman of the Federal Reserve in year t , and ΔVOLCKER t (ΔPOSTVOLCKER t ) 
equals 0 otherwise.  
The sample period for Panel A begins in 1956 and ends in 2007.  Estimating ΔCONS t requires Compustat data, and therefore the 
sample period for Panel B begins in 1964 and ends in 2007.   ***, **, and * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.
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Line Item Financial Accounting Tax Accounting
National Income and 
Product Accounts
1 Depreciation Expense Book value depreciated 
(generally) using straight-
line method
Modified Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System
Current replacement cost 
depreciated using straight-
line method
2 Cost of Goods Sold First In First Out (FIFO), 
Last In First Out (LIFO), or 
weighted average
Same as financial 
accounting
Current replacement cost 
valuation
3 Stock Option Expense Expense recognized at 
grant date based on fair 
value of options
Expense recognized upon 
option exercise
Same as tax accounting
4 Impairment of Long-Lived 
Assets
Loss recognized when 
undiscounted cash flows 
exceed asset carrying value
Expenses are recognized 
when incurred
Same as tax accounting
5 Investment Tax Credit Credit is recognized over 
the life of the acquired 
asset
Credit is fully recognized 
upon asset acquisition
Same as tax accounting
6 Payments from Related 
Foreign Companies
No income or expense on a 
consolidated basis
Receipts are considered 
constructive taxable 
income
Same as financial 
accounting
7 Mineral Exploration 
Expenditures
Expenditures are 
capitalized and depreciated 
over the life of the asset
Expenditures are expensed 
when incurred
Same as financial 
accounting
8 Depletion Depletion is cost based (i.e. 
per unit expense calculated 
by dividing the cost of the 
natural resource by the 
estimated units in the 
deposit)
Depletion is either cost 
based or a percentage of 
the gross income from the 
deposit
No depletion expense 
recognized
9 Bonus Payments for 
Drilling Rights
Payments are included in 
asset depletion base.  
Payments are immediately 
expensed if drilling is 
abandoned.  
Same as financial 
accounting
No bonus payment expense 
recognized
10 Bad Debt Expense Expense recognized upon 
change in estimate of 
uncollectible accounts
Expense recognized when 
debts are written off
No bad debt expense 
recognized
Appendix A
This Appendix outlines differences in the accounting treatment of select income statement line items between 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for financial accounting, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) for tax 
accounting, and the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
when constructing aggregate corporate profits.  For a more complete discussion of differences between GAAP, the 
IRC, and NIPA, see the BEA methodology paper "Corporate Profits: Profits Before Tax, Profits Tax Liability, and 
Dividends " available on the BEA website www.bea.gov.  
Differences Between Financial, Tax, and National Income and Product Accounting
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 Line Line Item 2006 Amount Note
1 Gross domestic product 13,398.9       Line 1 = Line 2 + Line 7 + Line 14 + Line 21
2 Personal consumption expenditures 9,322.7         
3   Goods 3,221.7         
4     Durable goods 1,133.0         
5     Nondurable goods 2,088.7         
6   Services 6,100.9         
7 Gross private domestic investment 2,327.2         
8   Fixed investment 2,267.2         
9     Nonresidential 1,505.3         
10       Structures 433.7            
11       Equipment and software 1,071.7         
12     Residential 761.9            
13   Change in private inventories 60.0              
14 Net exports of goods and services (769.3)           
15   Exports 1,471.0         
16     Goods 1,024.4         
17     Services 446.6            
18   Imports 2,240.3         
19     Goods 1,884.9         
20     Services 355.4            
21 Undistributed corporate profits 2,518.4         
22   Federal 931.7            
23     National defense 624.9            
24     Nondefense 306.8            
25   State and local 1,586.7         
Appendix B
Expenditures Approach for Measuring Gross Domestic Product
This Appendix illustrates the "expenditures approach" for measuring gross domestic product (GDP).  This appendix 
shows the 2006 values for National Income and Product Account (NIPA) Table 1.1.5 in billions of year 2006 dollars 
.  Gross Domestic Product is theoretically equivalent to Gross Domestic Income (GDI) measured using the "income 
approach" illustrated in Appendix C.  In practice, estimates of GDP and GDI may vary slightly due to differences in 
estimation techniques and underlying source data as shown by the statistical discrepancy in Appendix C.  
[Billions of dollars]
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 Line Line Item 2006 Amount Note
1 Gross domestic income         13,619.5 Line 1 = Line 2 + Line 9 - Line 10 + Line 11+ Line 23
2 Compensation of employees, paid           7,483.6 
3   Wage and salary accruals           6,076.8 
4     Disbursements           6,075.5 
5       To persons           6,066.0 
6       To the rest of the world                  9.5 
7     Wage accruals less disbursements                  1.3 
8   Supplements to wages and salaries           1,406.9 
9 Taxes on production and imports              986.8 
10 Less: Subsidies                51.4 
11 Net operating surplus           3,539.7 
12   Private enterprises           3,544.0 
13     Net interest and misc. payments              830.1 
14     Business current transfer payments (net)                83.0 
15     Proprietors' income with IV and CC adjustments           1,133.0 
16     Rental income of persons with CC adjustment              146.5 
17     Corporate profits with IV and CC adjustments           1,351.5 See also NIPA Table 1.7.5 Line 17
18       Taxes on corporate income              473.3 
19       Profits after tax with IV and CC adjustments              878.2 
20         Net dividends              626.9 
21         Undistributed corporate profits              251.3 
22   Current surplus of government enterprises                (4.2)
23 Consumption of fixed capital           1,660.7 
24   Private           1,391.4 
25   Government              269.3 
    
26   Statistical discrepancy            (220.6)
Gross domestic product         13,398.9 GDP = Line 1 + Line 26
Appendix C
Income Approach for Measuring Gross Domestic Product
This Appendix illustrates the "income approach" for measuring gross domestic product (GDP).  This appendix shows the 2006 values for 
National Income and Product Account (NIPA) Table 1.10 in billions of year 2006 dollars .  Items of interest include Corporate Profits with 
Inventory Valuation (IV) and Capital Consumption (CC) Adjustments in Line 17.  This aggregate corporate profits measure used within the 
empirical tests is an input to Net Operating Surplus in Line 11 which, in turn, is an input to Gross Domestic Income (Line 1).  Finally, Gross 
Domestic Income (GDI) is theoretically equivalent to Gross Domestic Product measured using the "expenditures approach" illustrated in 
Appendix B.  In practice, estimates of GDP and GDI may vary slightly due to differences in estimation techniques and underlying source data 
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